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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON CONTRACTS
Zenan Wu
Hanming Fang
This dissertation consists of two essays on contract theory. I investigate contracts
under di↵erent economics contexts. In the first chapter, I consider a two-period
model in which the success of the firm depends on the e↵ort of a first-period manager
(the incumbent) and the ability of a second-period manager. At the end of the
first period, the board receives a noisy signal of the incumbent manager’s ability
and decides whether to retain or replace the incumbent manager. I show that the
information technology the board has to assess the incumbent manager’s ability is an
important determinant of the optimal contract and replacement policy. The contract
must balance providing incentives for the incumbent manager to exert e↵ort and
ensuring that the second-period manager is of high ability. I show that severance
pay in the contract serves as a costly commitment device to induce e↵ort. Unlike
existing models, I identify conditions on the information structure under which both
entrenchment and anti-entrenchment emerge in the optimal contract. In the second
chapter, I use a dynamic model of life insurance with one-sided commitment and
bequest-driven lapsation, as in Daily, Hendel and Lizzeri (2008) and Fang and Kung
(2010), but with policyholders who may underestimate the probability of losing their
bequest motive, to analyze how the life settlement market – the secondary market for
life insurance – may a↵ect consumer welfare in equilibrium. I show that life settlement
v
may increase consumer welfare in equilibrium when (i) policyholders are su ciently
overconfident; and (ii) the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption
(IES) of policyholders is greater than one.
vi
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Chapter 1
Managerial Turnover and
Entrenchment
This chapter is a joint work with Xi Weng.
1.1 Introduction
Designing compensation schemes in managerial contracts and deciding whether to
replace a manager, such as a CEO, are important aspects of firm organization. These
decisions are linked through the severance agreement, a key component of the con-
tracts between a board and a manager. The severance agreement specifies payments
to the manager upon his forced departure. Approximately 50% of the CEO compen-
sation contracts implemented between 1994 and 1999 involved some form of severance
agreement (Rusticus, 2006). The percentage of S&P firms that included a severance
agreement in their CEO compensation contracts increased from 20% in 1993 to more
1
than 55% in 2007 (Huang, 2011). In general, a contract with a severance agreement
adds an explicit cost to the board’s retention decision and makes replacement more
di cult relative to a compensation contract without such an agreement.
A widely held belief is that CEOs are replaced too infrequently, or entrenched.1
Entrenchment may arise for many reasons. For example, it may be an instance of
governance failure in the form of a captive board of directors (Inderst and Mueller,
2010; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998) or a way to mitigate
a moral hazard problem (Almazan and Suarez, 2003; Casamatta and Guembel, 2010;
Manso, 2011). Taylor (2010) makes the first attempt to measure the cost of entrench-
ment using a structural model of CEO turnover and finds suggestive evidence of the
opposite. In particular, he finds that boards in large firms fire CEOs with higher
frequency than is optimal. We refer to this phenomenon as anti-entrenchment. This
finding cannot be rationalized by the existing models on CEO turnover and thus calls
for a new model to better understand the determinants of managerial turnover.
This paper investigates how optimal design of the severance agreement influences
managerial entrenchment. A manager is said to be entrenched if the board retains
an incumbent manager who has an expected ability lower than that of a replacement
manager. Anti-entrenchment occurs when the board fires some managers with higher
than average expected ability. We propose a two-period principal-agent model of
managerial turnover and identify conditions that predict the emergence of entrench-
1Although evidence shows forced CEO turnover is increasing over time and indicates boards are
using more aggressive replacement policies, it is widely believed that CEOs are rarely fired and thus
are entrenched. For instance, Kaplan and Minton (2012) find that board-driven turnover increased
steadily from 10.93% (1992 1999) to 12.47% (2000 2007) using data from publicly traded Fortune
500 companies.
2
ment and anti-entrenchment. Formally, we consider a setup in which the first-period
manager is incentivized by a contract that contains performance-related pay and
severance pay. The firm’s success depends on the initial manager’s e↵ort and the
second-period manager’s ability. Thus, the board faces an ability selection problem
and a moral hazard problem. After the initial manager exerts e↵ort, the board ob-
serves a non-contractible signal regarding his ability. The board can fire the initial
manager by paying the severance pay specified in the contract and hire a replacement
manager. Since the board’s information about the initial manager’s ability is non-
contractible, it lacks commitment power and cannot write a contract that specifies a
retention decision contingent on the signal. Severance pay is used as a costly device
to provide commitment to not firing the initial manager. By committing to a high
severance pay, the board ensures a low expected profit for itself after replacement,
which leads to a less aggressive replacement policy. The board’s optimal replacement
policy balances incentive provision, manager selection and commitment.
Our main result characterizes the optimal replacement policy and shows how it
depends on the precision of the signal of the manager’s ability. When this monitoring
technology is noisy, entrenchment is optimal. In such a scenario, the board places
higher priority on motivating the incumbent manager to exert e↵ort rather than on
maximizing the manager’s ability. Setting an aggressive replacement policy will fire
the incumbent of high ability too often and dis-incentivize the incumbent to exert
e↵ort, while saving little on severance pay. As a result, a contract that induces
entrenchment is optimal for the board.
Anti-entrenchment is optimal when the board’s monitoring technology is su -
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ciently informative. The board is reluctant to provide commitment. On the one
hand, a contract that favors the incumbent manager does not increase e↵ort by much
because of the low probability of replacement when the incumbent is of high ability.
On the other hand, an aggressive replacement policy helps the board avoid paying the
performance-related pay to the incumbent manager and can increase the firms profit.
Thus, anti-entrenchment is optimal for the board. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to study the interaction between the board’s monitoring technol-
ogy and managerial turnover, and to show that a contract with anti-entrenchment is
sometimes optimal.
Our model can be applied to a variety of real-world settings. For example, the
model can be used to analyze the turnover of founder CEOs in venture-capital-backed
companies where the venture capitalist is a large shareholder and engages in active
monitoring. It could also be used to analyze the contracts between head coaches and
professional sports teams.
Related Literature: This paper belongs to the literature on the principal-agent
model with replacement.2 One strand of research views entrenchment as a po-
tential source of ine ciency that the board aims to mitigate. Consequently, anti-
entrenchment cannot be observed. Inderst and Mueller (2010) solve the optimal
contract for the incumbent manager who holds private information on the firm’s
future performance and can avoid replacement by concealing bad information. Con-
sequently, the optimal contract is designed to induce the incumbent to voluntarily
step down when evidence suggests low expected profit under his management. Sim-
2See Laux (2014) for a comprehensive survey of the theoretical models on this topic.
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ilarly, entrenchment occurs if the incumbent can make manager-specific investments
to create cost of replacement to the board (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) or if there exist
close ties between the board and manager (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).
Another strand of research views entrenchment as a feature of the optimal contract
(board structure) that helps overcome the moral hazard problem. Manso (2011) shows
that tolerance for early failure (entrenchment) can be part of the optimal incentive
scheme when motivating a manager to pursue more innovative business strategies is
important to the board. Casamatta and Guembel (2010) study the optimal contract
for the incumbent manager with reputational concern. In their model, entrenchment
is optimal because the incumbent manager would like to see his strategy succeed and
is less costly to motivate than the replacement manager. Almazan and Suarez (2003)
study the optimal board structure for incentivizing the incumbent manager. They
show that it can be optimal for shareholders to relinquish some power and choose a
weak board, where the incumbent can veto his departure, rather than a strong board,
where the board can fire the incumbent at will. In the same spirit, Laux (2008)
studies the optimal degree of board independence for shareholders. He shows that
some lack of independence can increase shareholder value. In these papers, boards
(shareholders) provide better job security to the incumbent by making dismissal more
di cult to induce more e↵ort. Our paper contributes to the existing literature by
pointing out that despite all the incentive-providing merits of entrenchment, the cost
of incentivizing can be high when the board’s monitoring technology is su ciently
informative.
In terms of modeling, the paper is most similar to Taylor and Yildirim (2011).
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They study the benefits and costs of di↵erent review policies and identify conditions
under which the principal commits not to utilize the agent’s information and chooses
blind review as optimal policy. We apply their model to analyze managerial turnover
by adding a contract stage to endogenize the agent’s payo↵ and allowing the principal
to replace the agent in the interim stage.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 defines entrenchment and anti-entrenchment and characterizes the optimal
contract. Section 4 studies the impact of informativeness on optimal replacement
policy. Section 5 discusses extensions of the model. Section 6 concludes. All proofs
are in the Appendix.
1.2 Model
There are two periods t = 1, 2 and an initial contract stage.
Contract stage. The board (principal), hires a manager (agent) from a pool with
unknown ability ✓i 2 {0, 1} to work for the firm with common prior Pr(✓i = 1) = 12 .3
The ability is unknown to both sides. The board o↵ers a contract to the manager.
We describe the contract details below.
Both the board and the managers are risk-neutral. Moreover, we assume that
managers are protected by limited liability.4 Finally, we assume the value of the
outside option to the manager is 0. This assumption guarantees that the individual
3The analysis is unchanged for a di↵erent prior of ✓i.
4This assumption is necessary because it excludes the possibility that the board sells the whole
firm to the manager in order to provide the greatest possible incentive in the optimal contract.
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rationality (IR) constraint never binds and simplifies the analysis.
Period 1. The manager exerts e↵ort to create a project of quality q with cost
C(q) = 12q
2. Simultaneously, the board receives a signal s 2 S of the manager’s ability
and decides whether to replace the incumbent manager. If the incumbent manager
is fired, a replacement manager is hired and has ability ✓r randomly drawn from the
same pool of managers.5
Period 2. The manager who stays in o ce implements the project with no ad-
ditional e↵ort and payo↵s are realized. Implementation is assumed to be costless
and depends only on manager’s ability.6 To formalize this idea, we assume that the
expected quality of the project is equal to q✓˜, where q is the incumbent manager’s
choice of how much e↵ort to exert and ✓˜ is the ability of the manager who stays in
o ce at the beginning of period 2. With probability q✓˜, the project is of high quality
and yields outcome y = 1. With complementary probability 1   q✓˜, the project is
of low quality and yields outcome y = 0. After payo↵s are realized, the incumbent
manager receives payment according to the contract signed in period 0 and the game
comes to an end.
In the optimal contract, the wage for low output is 0. A contract is defined by
the tuple (w, k), where w is the wage rate when y = 1 and k is the severance pay to
the incumbent manager if he is fired. By the limited liability assumption, w   0 and
5The project generation process can also be interpreted as a project selection process as in
Casamatta and Guembel (2010). Assume some unknown state of the world ⌘ 2 [0, 1] is randomly
drawn, and a manager is hired to select a project a 2 [0, 1] to match the underlying state. The
quality of the project is 1 if a = ⌘ and 0 otherwise. The manager incurs cost C(q) to receive a
signal ⌫ of the true state. With probability q, the manager identifies ⌘, that is, ⌫ = ⌘, and with
probability 1  q, ⌫ is pure noise. Given q, the expected quality of the selected project is q. These
two specifications lead to the same model.
6This assumption is relaxed in Section 5.2.
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Figure 1.1: Timeline
k   0.
Information structure. The board receives a noisy signal s 2 S about in-
cumbent manager’s ability ✓i. s is drawn from distribution with cdf F✓i(·) and pdf
f✓i(·) for ✓i 2 {0, 1}. Without loss of generality, we assume S = [0, 1] and nor-
malize s = 12F1(s) +
1
2F0(s) for s 2 [0, 1].7 The two conditional density functions 
f1(s), f0(s)
 
su ce to define an information structure under such normalization.
Three assumptions are imposed on the information structure.
Assumption 1 The monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP): f1(s)f0(s) is strictly in-
creasing in s for s 2 [0, 1].
7This assumption is without loss of generality due to the fact any information structure can be
normalized via integral probability transformation. See Appendix B for more details.
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For binary states, the MLRP assumption is without loss of generality because
signals can always be relabeled according to likelihood ratio to satisfy this assumption.
Assumption 2 Perfectly informative at extreme signals: lims!0
f1(s)
f0(s)
= 0 and
lims!1
f1(s)
f0(s)
= +1.
Assumption 2 guarantees that support of the posterior belief is always [0, 1]. The
last assumption imposed on the information structure is symmetry. This assumption
allows us to define the first best replacement policy on the signal space.
Assumption 3 f1(s) = f0(1  s) for all s 2 [0, 1].
By Assumption 3, f1(
1
2) = f0(
1
2). Thus the likelihood ratio at s =
1
2 is always
1 and the Bayesian update of the incumbent manager’s ability at 12 is equal to the
prior.
Finally we introduce an index ↵ 2 (0,1) to parameterize the information struc-
ture. We assume that f✓i(s;↵) is continuous in s and ↵ for ✓i 2
 
0, 1
 
and define the
information structures for the two extreme values of ↵ as follows.
Assumption 4 (Completely informative/uninformative information structure)
1. The information structure becomes completely uninformative when ↵! 0, i.e.,
lim↵!0[f0(s;↵)  f1(s;↵)] = 0 for s 2 (0, 1).
2. The information structure becomes completely informative when ↵ ! 1, i.e.,
lim↵!1 f1(s;↵) = 0 for s 2 [0, 12) and lim↵!1 f0(s;↵) = 0 for s 2 (12 , 1].8
8Both completely informative and uninformative information structures are defined using point-
wise convergence.
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When the information structure becomes completely uninformative (↵ ! 0), the
two conditional density functions are the same. When the information structure
becomes completely informative (↵!1), the board will not observe a signal below
1
2 when the incumbent manager is of high ability and a signal above
1
2 when the
incumbent manager’s ability is low.
1.3 The Optimal Contract
1.3.1 The benchmark case: contractible e↵ort
We first pin down the socially optimal replacement policy. By Assumption 1, the
socially optimal replacement policy is a cuto↵ rule. Denote sˆ as the signal cuto↵.
Lemma 1 (First best cuto↵) Suppose the board can contract on e↵ort q of the
incumbent manager. Then the optimal e↵ort is qFB = 12 +
1
4
⇥
F0(sˆFB)   F1(sˆFB)
⇤
,
where the optimal replacement cuto↵ sˆFB = 12 .
When e↵ort is contractible, the board is able to optimize e↵ort and selection sepa-
rately. Thus, there is no tradeo↵ between the moral hazard problem and the selection
problem. It is optimal to replace the incumbent manager when the posterior belief
about the incumbent’s ability falls below the expected value of the pool and retain the
incumbent otherwise. By Assumption 3, the likelihood ratio f1(s)f0(s) at s =
1
2 is always
equal to 1. Consequently, the Bayesian update of the incumbent manager’s ability
is always equal to the prior independent of the informativeness ↵ of the information
structure. Consequently, the socially optimal cuto↵ sˆFB = 12 for all ↵.
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Given the first best cuto↵, we can now define entrenchment. Denote (w⇤, k⇤) as
the optimal contract to the board. Let (sˆ⇤, q⇤) be the equilibrium replacement cuto↵
and e↵ort of the continuation game induced by the optimal contract.
Definition 1 We define entrenchment as a cuto↵ sˆ⇤ < 12 and anti-entrenchment
as sˆ⇤ > 12 .
For the case where sˆ⇤ = 12 , we say that neither entrenchment nor anti-entrenchment
is observed. The replacement policy coincides with the socially optimal policy. When
sˆ⇤ < 12 , the replacement policy favors the incumbent manager: the board could have
improved implementation by replacing the incumbent. Similarly, the replacement
policy is considered aggressive and places the incumbent manager at a disadvantage
when sˆ⇤ > 12 .
1.3.2 Characterizing the Optimal Contract
In this section, we solve the equilibrium outcome when e↵ort is non-contractible. The
board can only commit to the wage w and severance pay k in the contract. We are
interested in the cuto↵ sˆ⇤ induced by the optimal contract.
Incentives under fixed contract (w, k)
A contract (w, k) induces a simultaneous move game. We first solve the sub-game in
period 1, fixing contract (w, k). The incumbent manager’s e↵ort q and the board’s
replacement policy sˆ will be determined in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
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For contract (w, k), the incumbent manager’s best response to cuto↵ sˆ is e↵ort q
that maximizes:
max
q
1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
qw +
1
2
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤
k   C(q).
) q(sˆ;w, k) = 1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
w. (1.1)
The board can provide incentive on e↵ort by increasing wage w or lowering equilibrium
cuto↵ sˆ. For a fixed contract (w, k) the board’s best response to the incumbent
manager’s e↵ort level q is cuto↵ sˆ that maximizes:
max
sˆ
1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
q(1  w) + 1
2
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤ 1
2
q   k .
) sˆ(q;w, k) solves f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
q(1  w) = 1
2
q   k. (1.2)
Because a higher cuto↵ implies higher posterior belief about the incumbent man-
ager’s ability, the board chooses a cuto↵ such that the expected profit created by the
marginal incumbent manager is equal to the expected profit under replacement in
equilibrium.
Given contract (w, k), the optimal cuto↵ and e↵ort
 
sˆ(w, k), q(w, k)
 
are pinned
down by equations (1.1) and (1.2). We can calculate the corresponding contract (w, k)
that induces any tuple (sˆ, q) as follows,
w(sˆ, q) =
q
1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤ (1.3)
12
and
k(sˆ, q) =
1
2
q   f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
q
⇥
1  w(sˆ, q)⇤.9 (1.4)
Derive the optimal contract for fixed replacement policy
The board chooses contract (w, k) to maximize expected profit:
max
{w,k}
1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
q(1  w) + 1
2
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤ 1
2
q   k 
s.t.
q =
1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
w
and
f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
q(1  w) = 1
2
q   k.
Equivalently, the board is maximizing expected profit over (sˆ, q), with w(sˆ, q) and
k(sˆ, q) as determined in equations (1.3) and (1.4). Substituting equations (1.3) and
(1.4) into the board’s profit function yields expected profit as a function of (sˆ, q),
q

1  q1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤ ⇢1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+
1
2
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤ f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
 
.
It can be verified that q = 14
⇥
1   F1(sˆ)
⇤
under the optimal contract. Consequently,
w⇤ = 12 . We summarize the results of the previous pages in a lemma.
9The non-negativity assumption on k is not always satisfied for all sˆ and q. We ignore this limited
liability constraint for the moment and solve the unconstrained problem. This is not a big concern
since it can be proved later that the optimal wage is w⇤ = 12 and k is non-negative for all sˆ 2 [0, 1].
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Lemma 2 Fixing sˆ, the board maximizes expected profit by o↵ering a contract,
w =
1
2
and
k(sˆ) =
1
4
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤1
2
  1
2
f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
 
.
Moreover, in equilibrium, the incumbent manager chooses e↵ort
q(sˆ) =
1
4
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
.
By Lemma 2, k(sˆ) is decreasing in the equilibrium cuto↵ sˆ. By committing to
a higher severance pay, the board chooses a lower replacement cuto↵ in equilibrium
and is able to induce more e↵ort. The expected profit can be rewritten in terms of sˆ
alone:
⇡(sˆ) :=
1
8
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤⇢1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+
1
2
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤ f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
 
.
The optimal cuto↵ depends on the informativeness of the information structure.
Rewrite the expected profit as follows:
⇡(sˆ) =
1
8
h
1  F1(sˆ)
i
| {z }
incentive e↵ect
(h1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+
1
4
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤i| {z }
selection e↵ect
+
1
2
h
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
i⇣ f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
  1
2
⌘
| {z }
commitment e↵ect
)
.
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Three e↵ects play a role in determining the optimal cuto↵. Because the outcome
depends on the expected ability of the manager in period 2, the board faces a selection
problem. This is captured by
h
1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+ 14
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤i
, which is called the
selection e↵ect . This is the expected ability of the manager in period 2. Increasing
sˆ will increase the expected ability of the manager in o ce when sˆ < 12 and decrease
the expected ability when sˆ   12 . To optimize selection independently, the board
would choose sˆ = 12 .
Because the outcome also depends on the e↵ort choice of the incumbent manager,
the board faces a moral hazard problem and needs to incentivize the incumbent.
This is captured by
⇥
1   F1(sˆ)
⇤
, which is referred to as the incentive e↵ect . As the
equilibrium replacement cuto↵ sˆ increases, the incumbent manager expects a lower
retaining probability in equilibrium and exerts less e↵ort accordingly. The board
provides more job security to better incentivize the incumbent manager in response.
By this e↵ect alone, the board sets sˆ = 0.
If the selection e↵ect and the incentive e↵ect were the only e↵ects, a cuto↵ be-
low 12 is optimal to the board and entrenchment emerges under optimal contract.
However, because the signal is non-contractible, board lacks commitment power on
replacement policy. Severance pay serves as a costly commitment device that helps
make replacement of the incumbent less likely. As the severance pay increases, it
lowers the expected payo↵ of replacement, which creates a stronger incentive for the
board to not replace the incumbent. In equilibrium the expected profit of replace-
ment is equal to the expected profit created by the marginal incumbent manager.
When board lowers the cuto↵ (sˆ < 12) to provide more incentive on e↵ort, it has to
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increase severance pay to make the equilibrium replacement policy credible. This
generates a net loss compared to the first best replacement policy. It is captured
by 12
h
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
i⇣
f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ)+f0(sˆ)
  12
⌘
, which is referred to as the commitment e↵ect .
Compared to the first best cuto↵ sˆ = 12 , the board obtains a net commitment gain
by providing less commitment and designing a contract that induces cuto↵ above
1
2 . Similarly, the board su↵ers a commitment loss by committing to a cuto↵ that is
below 12 . The net commitment e↵ect is shown by
⇣
f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ)+f0(sˆ)
  12
⌘
. Multiplied by the
probability of replacement, this yields the total net commitment gain/loss. By this
e↵ect alone, the board sets sˆ = 1.
If incentive e↵ect dominates commitment e↵ect, entrenchment is optimal to the
board. Otherwise, anti-entrenchment is optimal.
1.4 The Optimal Replacement Policy
In this section, we study how the optimal replacement policy varies depending on the
informativeness of the board’s monitoring technology.
1.4.1 Replacement at limiting distribution
Proposition 1 Suppose
 
f1(·;↵), f0(·;↵)
 
satisfies Assumptions 1 - 4. Then there
exist ↵ and ↵ such that,
1. sˆ⇤(↵) > 12 for ↵ > ↵;
2. sˆ⇤(↵) < 12 for ↵ < ↵.
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When the information structure is noisy, providing incentives is more profitable
than obtaining more commitment. Choosing sˆ > 12 reduces severance pay by a small
amount because the Bayesian update around sˆ = 12 changes very slowly and the
expected ability of the incumbent manager at the cuto↵ is close to the expected
ability at a cuto↵ of 12 . On the other hand, choosing sˆ >
1
2 reduces the incumbent
manager’s incentive to exert e↵ort. Consequently, it is optimal for the board to design
a contract that leads to entrenchment.
When the board’s monitoring technology is su ciently informative, the benefit
of commitment dominates and choosing sˆ < 12 is not optimal for the board. Since
the probability of firing a high ability manager is very small for all signals below
1
2 , lowering the equilibrium replacement cuto↵ does not have a large e↵ect on the
incumbent’s e↵ort. On the other hand, it is easy to obtain commitment gain. The
expected ability of the manager in the right neighborhood of 12 is very close to 1
when the information structure is su ciently informative. That is, the board can
largely reduce the severance pay by choosing a cuto↵ slightly above 12 . Thus, anti-
entrenchment is optimal to the board.
1.4.2 Optimal replacement and informativeness
Proposition 1 does not characterize the equilibrium replacement policy for interme-
diate ↵. To do this, it is necessary to introduce an information order.
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Distribution of posterior beliefs
Denote p = '(s) as the posterior belief of ✓ after observing signal s. Then '(s) =
f1(s)
f1(s)+f0(s)
. By Assumption 1, '(s) is strictly increasing in s. By Assumption 2,
the support of p is [0, 1]. Denote g(p) as the corresponding density function. Since
E(E(✓|s)) = 12 , the only constraint we impose on g(·) is that
R 1
0 pg(p)dp =
1
2 .
Given an information structure
 
f1(·), f0(·)
 
, the density function of posterior
belief p can be calculated as follows:
g(p) =
1
2

f1('
 1(p)) + f0(' 1(p))
 
d' 1(p)
dp
.
Lemma 3 For any density function g(·) with support [0, 1] that satisfies R 10 pg(p)dp =
1
2 , there exists a unique information structure
 
f1(·), f0(·)
 
that induces g(·).
By Lemma 3, there exists a one-to-one mapping between g(·) and information
structure
 
f1(·), f0(·)
 
. Thus working on the information structure
 
f1(·), f0(·)
 
is
equivalent to working on distribution of the posterior belief g(·). Consequently, we can
define information order on g(·). By Assumption 3 on  f1(·), f0(·) , g(p) = g(1  p)
and G(p) = 1 G(1  p) for p 2 [0, 1]. Thus, it su ces to order di↵erent information
structures based on G(p) for p 2 [0, 12 ].
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The ⇢-concave order
We use ⇢-concavity to define the informativeness of the information structure.10 To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that defines information order using
⇢-concavity.
Given G(·), define local ⇢-concavity at p as,
⇢(p) := 1  G(p)g
0(p)
g2(p)
.
By definition, ⇢(p) is the power of G(·) such that the second order Taylor expansion
at p drops out. Thus, ⇢(p) is a measure of the concavity of G(·) at point p. Log-
concavity is equivalent to ⇢(p)   0 and concavity is equivalent to ⇢(p)   1. We
focus on the distributions such that ⇢(p) 2 (0,1). This assumption is a necessary
condition to guarantee the initial condition G(0) = 0 is satisfied.11
Definition 2 (⇢-concave order) G1(p) is said to be more informative than G2(p)
in the ⇢-concave order if ⇢(p|G1) > ⇢(p|G2) for all p 2 [0, 12 ].
By definition, G1(p) is more informative than G2(p) if G1(p) is everywhere more
concave than G2(p) measured by local ⇢-concavity. The ⇢-concave order is a stronger
condition than the rotation order and Blackwell’s order: if a family of distributions
is ordered according to the ⇢-concave order, then it is rotation-ordered and ordered
in the sense of Blackwell.12
10For more applications of ⇢-concavity in economics, see Mares and Swinkels (2014) on auction
theory; Anderson and Renault (2003), Weyl and Fabinger (2013) on industry organization.
11Imposing this non-negativity assumption on ⇢(·) is without loss of generality: a completely
uninformative information structure can still be defined under this constraint.
12See Appendix C for more details.
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Assume that maxp2[0, 12 ]
 
⇢(p;↵)
 
and maxp2[0, 12 ]
 
⇢(p;↵)
 
exist for all ↵ 2 (0,1).
Denote ⇢(↵) = maxp2[0, 12 ]
 
⇢(p;↵)
 
and ⇢(↵) = minp2[0, 12 ]
 
⇢(p;↵)
 
for notational
convenience.
Lemma 4 Suppose 0 < ⇢  ⇢ <1. Then 12(2p)
1
⇢  G(p)  12(2p)
1
⇢ for p 2 [0, 12 ].
By Lemma 4, G(p) can be bounded by two constant cumulative density functions
with constant ⇢-concavity. A completely informative information structure corre-
sponds to the case where lim↵!1 ⇢(↵) = 1 and a completely uninformative infor-
mation structure is equivalent to lim↵!1 ⇢(↵) = 0.13 The following assumptions are
imposed on the family of distribution
 
G(·;↵) indexed by ↵ 2 (0,1).
Assumption 5 (a) Log concavity: ⇢(p;↵) 2 (0,1) for (p,↵) 2 [0, 12 ]⇥ (0,1).
(b) ⇢-concave order: If ↵1 > ↵2, ⇢(p;↵1) > ⇢(p;↵2) for p 2 [0, 12 ].
(c) Regularity 1: 8↵, ⇢(p;↵) is weakly decreasing in p for p 2 [0, 12 ].14
(d) Regularity 2: There exists ↵ such that ⇢(p;↵) = 1 for all p 2 [0, 12 ].
(e) Normalization: lim↵!1 ⇢(↵) =1 and lim↵!0 ⇢(↵) = 0.
By Assumption 5(a), we focus on G(p;↵) which is log-concave in p 2 [0, 12 ]. To-
gether with Assumption 5(c), Assumption 5(d) guarantees that the concavity/convexity
of G(·) will not change for given ↵. Assumption 5(e) restates Assumption 4 in the
language of the ⇢-concavity.
13See Appendix C for detailed proof.
14As will be clear later, this assumption generates a well-behaved profit function for p 2 [0, 12 ].
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The optimal replacement policy
Denote pˆ as the cuto↵ of the posterior belief and ⇡˜(pˆ) as the board’s profit as a
function of pˆ. Then
⇡˜(pˆ) =
1
4
Z 1
pˆ
tg(t)dt| {z }
incentive e↵ect
⇢
1
2
G(pˆ) +
Z 1
pˆ
tg(t)dt| {z }
selection e↵ect
+
 
pˆ  1
2
  Z pˆ
0
g(t)dt| {z }
commitment e↵ect
 
.
The profit function can be further simplified by combining the selection e↵ect and
the commitment e↵ect,
⇡˜(pˆ) =
1
4
Z 1
pˆ
tg(t)dt| {z }
incentive e↵ect
⇢Z 1
pˆ
tg(t)dt + pˆG(pˆ)| {z }
selection+commitment e↵ect
 
.
The expression of the total selection and commitment e↵ect is intuitive. In equi-
librium, the board’s expected profit of replacement is equal to the expected profit
created by the marginal incumbent manager with expected ability pˆ. Hence the
board is replacing the incumbent manager of ability p  pˆ with pˆ taking commitment
into consideration. It can be verified that the total of the selection e↵ect and the
commitment e↵ect is increasing in pˆ and thus is maximized at pˆ = 1.
The first order derivative with respect to pˆ yields,
⇡˜0(pˆ) =
1
4
24 pˆg(pˆ) 1  Z 1
pˆ
G(t)dt
!
+G(pˆ)
Z 1
pˆ
tg(t)dt
35 .
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) ⇡˜0(pˆ) S 0 , pˆg(pˆ)
G(pˆ)
T
R 1
pˆ tg(t)dt
1  R 1pˆ G(t)dt.
From the first order condition, pˆg(pˆ) is the marginal incentive e↵ect and G(pˆ) is the
marginal selection plus commitment e↵ect. Whether profit is increasing or decreasing
in pˆ largely depends on the ratio of these two marginal e↵ects, which is also the elas-
ticity of G(·) at point pˆ. Since ⇡˜(1) = 0, the incentive e↵ect dominates the selection
plus commitment e↵ect when pˆ is close to 1. To relate ⇢-concavity to the profit func-
tion, notice that pˆg(pˆ)G(pˆ) =
  R pˆ
0 ⇢(t)dt
pˆ
  1
, which is the inverse of the average ⇢-concavity
of G(·) from 0 to pˆ. This ratio is weakly increasing if ⇢(p;↵) is weakly decreasing in
p for p 2 [0, 12 ] by Assumption 5(c). This assumption guarantees that the marginal
incentive e↵ect changes faster than the marginal selection plus commitment e↵ect
and yields a well-behaved profit function for pˆ 2 [0, 12 ]. Assumption 5(b) (⇢-concave
order) guarantees that the marginal selection plus commitment e↵ect changes faster
than the marginal incentive e↵ect for given pˆ 2 [0, 12 ] as ↵ increases. Consequently,
the selection plus commitment e↵ect takes over as board’s monitoring technology
improves and anti-entrenchment is more likely to emerge.
Proposition 2 Suppose the family of distribution
 
G(·;↵) , indexed by ↵ 2 (0,1),
satisfies Assumption 5. Then there exists ↵1 and ↵2 such that
1. sˆ⇤(↵) = 0 for ↵ 2 (0,↵1];
2. sˆ⇤(↵) 2 (0, 12) for ↵ 2 (↵1,↵2);
3. sˆ⇤(↵) 2 (12 , 1) for ↵ 2 (↵2,1),
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where ↵1 satisfies ⇢(p;↵1) = 1 8 p 2 [0, 12 ] and ↵2 > ↵1.
Proposition 2 characterizes the optimal replacement policy for all ↵. When ↵ is
small, the board provides full job security and never fires the incumbent manager.
When ↵ is moderate, the board replaces the incumbent manager less frequently than
the socially optimal level and entrenchment is optimal. When ↵ is large, the board
uses an aggressive replacement policy and anti-entrenchment emerges. There exists
a clear cuto↵ between entrenchment and anti-entrenchment: once anti-entrenchment
is optimal for informativeness level ↵0, the optimal replacement policy is never en-
trenchment under a more informative information structure ↵ > ↵0.
A tractable example
Example 1 Suppose G(p) has the following functional form,
G(p) =
8>>><>>>:
1
2(2p)
1
↵ for pˆ 2 [0, 12 ]
1  12 [2(1  p)]
1
↵ for pˆ 2 (12 , 1]
.
Then the optimal cuto↵ is
1. for ↵  1, pˆ⇤(↵) = 0;
2. for 1 < ↵ <
p
5+1
2 , pˆ
⇤ 2 (0, 12);
3. for ↵ >
p
5+1
2 , pˆ
⇤ 2 (12 , 1).
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Figure 1.2: The optimal replacement policy
Given G(·), the two corresponding conditional density functions are
f1(s) =
8>>><>>>:
(2s)↵ for s 2 [0, 12 ]
2  ⇥2(1  s)⇤↵ for s 2 (12 , 1]
and
f0(s) =
8>>><>>>:
2  (2s)↵ for s 2 [0, 12 ]⇥
2(1  s)⇤↵ for s 2 (12 , 1] .
Figure 1.2 shows the optimal cuto↵ for di↵erent informativeness levels of the
monitoring technology. Turnover is increasing for ↵ 2 ⇥1, p5+12 ⇤ when the manager is
entrenched. The relationship between turnover and the informativeness of the board’s
monitoring technology is an inverted-U shape for ↵ >
p
5+1
2 . As ↵ approaches infinity,
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Figure 1.3: Severance pay in the optimal contract
the optimal cuto↵ converges to 12 .
Figure 1.3 shows that severance pay in the optimal contract is decreasing in the in-
formativeness of the board’s monitoring technology. When the information structure
becomes more informative, it is easier for the board to obtain net commitment gain.
Thus the board is less willing to commit to not replacing the incumbent manager and
the size of severance pay o↵ered in the optimal contract decreases as a result. This
generates a testable implication of the model: the size of the severance package is
decreasing in the informativeness of the board’s monitoring technology.
1.4.3 Discussion
An optimal replacement policy that di↵ers from the first best stems from two impor-
tant assumptions: the signal is non-contractible and severance pay is constant with
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respect to outcome, i.e., the board cannot provide performance-based severance pay.
Without either of these assumptions, neither entrenchment nor anti-entrenchment
emerges: the optimal replacement policy is always sˆ⇤ = 12 .
First consider what happens if the board’s signal is contractible, while maintaining
the assumption that severance pay is constant. A contract is fully characterized by 
w(s), r(s), k(s)
 
, where s 2 [0, 1].  w(s), k(s) is the promised wage and severance
pay after signal s. r(s) 2 [0, 1] specifies the retaining probability of the incumbent
manager at signal s. In particular, r(s) = 1 indicates that the incumbent manager is
retained while r(s) = 0 indicates that the incumbent is fired.15
Proposition 3 Suppose that the signal is contractible and severance pay is constant
with respect to outcome. Then k⇤(s) = 0. Moreover, r⇤(s) = 1 for s 2 [12 , 1] and
r⇤(s) = 0 for s 2 [0, 12).
Allowing the board to contract on signals gives the board commitment power on
its retention decision at no cost. Severance pay is a costly commitment device, and
is no longer used in the optimal contract.
The board can design a contract to induce any e↵ort level without deviating from
the socially optimal replacement cuto↵. The manager is risk-neutral and only cares
about the expected wage. Thus, the board can incentivize the incumbent manager
by increasing the expected wage payment, which is determined by both the wage
function w(s) and the replacement policy r(s). For given e↵ort q and replacement
15Due to the board’s risk neutrality, randomization is not optimal except for the case where the
board is indi↵erent between retaining and firing the incumbent manager, in which we assume the
incumbent manager is retained with probability 1.
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policy r(s), the board can adjust the wage function w(s) to induce q without changing
r(s). That is, the board can optimize e↵ort and selection separately if the signal is
contractible, and the replacement cuto↵ is equal to 12 in the optimal contract.
Next consider what happens when the board can condition the severance pay on
the outcome, while maintaining the assumption that the signal is non-contractible. A
contract is in the form of a triple (w1, w2, k). w1 is the wage rate when the incumbent
manager stays as in the baseline model. The tuple (w2, k) constitutes a severance
package. w2 is the payment to the incumbent manager if he is forced out and y = 1.
k is the constant severance pay as in the baseline model.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the signal is non-contractible and the board can provide
performance-based severance pay. Then k⇤ = 0, w⇤1 = w
⇤
2 and sˆ
⇤ = 12 .
Constant severance pay is less e↵ective to the board than performance-based sev-
erance pay when the incumbent manager is no longer in o ce because a lump-sum
payment rewards failure. Thus, only performance-based severance pay is employed
in the optimal contract.
Again the board has no incentive to deviate from the first best cuto↵. Due to man-
ager’s risk neutrality, the e↵ort choice of the incumbent manager is only determined
by the expected wage. For a given e↵ort level q that the board wants to motivate, the
expected wage is fixed, which is also the total cost to hire the incumbent manager.
Since q is fixed, it remains to maximize the expected ability of the manager who
stays in o ce in period 2. Hence the replacement cuto↵ stays at the first best in the
optimal contract.16
16In practice, a severance package usually comes in the form of a combination of a lump-sum
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1.5 Extensions
In this section, we show that the main result of the optimal replacement policy is
robust to several di↵erent specifications.
1.5.1 More e↵ort vs. better selection
It is interesting to study whether the main result on entrenchment (anti-entrenchment)
remains optimal when e↵ort becomes more important than ability. Anti-entrenchment
is less likely to emerge when selection becomes less important. We model this by de-
creasing the variance of the manager’s ability or increasing the importance of e↵ort
relative to ability in the success probability.
Assume the ability space is ✓ 2  12    , 12 +   , where   2  0, 12⇤ and the success
probability is equal to q1+⌧✓, where ⌧ 2 ( 1, 1).   is a measure of the variance of
manager’s ability ex ante while ⌧ is a measure of the relative importance of e↵ort
compared to selection. The baseline model corresponds to ( , ⌧) = (12 , 0). It is
intuitive that entrenchment remains optimal as ↵ approaches 0. Thus we focus on
the case where ↵ approaches infinity.
Proposition 5 (Comparative static)
1. if   > 12
1 ⌧
2   12 , there exists ↵¯A such that anti-entrenchment is optimal for
↵ > ↵¯A;
2. if   < 12
1 ⌧
2   12 , there exists ↵¯E such that entrenchment is optimal for ↵ > ↵¯E.
payment and a stock option. This can be rationalized by the assumption that the manager is more
risk-averse than the board. If that is the case, the optimal contract will involve some degree of
lump-sum payment in response to risk sharing.
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Figure 1.4: The optimal replacement policy at the limiting distribution
Fixing ⌧ , selection becomes more important as the variance of the manager’s
ability increases. The intuition from the baseline model applies when   is large, and
anti-entrenchment emerges in the optimal contract. When   is small, the marginal
productivity of a low ability manager is close to that of a high ability manager. Since
motivating the low ability manager is also important, the optimal contract leads to
entrenchment as ↵!1.
1.5.2 Costly execution
Suppose the outcome depends on the incumbent manager’s e↵ort q in period 1, e↵ort
e of the manager in period 2 as well as the ability of the manager in o ce in period
2. E↵ort q can be interpreted as the project quality of the project selected by the
incumbent manager and e can be interpreted as the e↵ort required to execute the
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project. Now the board needs to also o↵er a contract to the replacement manager.
Moreover, the optimal contract with the incumbent manager must balance a two-
dimensional moral hazard problem as well as the selection problem.
Assume the success probability is equal to ✓˜
⇥
(1    )q +  e˜⇤, where ✓˜ 2 {0, 1} is
the manager’s ability in period 2, q 2 [0, 1] is the e↵ort of the incumbent manager
in period 1 and e˜ 2 [0, 1] is the e↵ort of the manager in period 2. Period 1 e↵ort q
and period 2 e↵ort e are substitutes and   2 [0, 1] measures the relative importance
of period 1 e↵ort. When   = 0 the model simplifies to the baseline model. After the
board makes a retention decision, the manager in o ce at the beginning of period 2
exerts e↵ort e to execute the project. The cost function to the incumbent manager is
assumed to be separable and quadratic, i.e., Ci(q, e) =
1
2q
2 + 12e
2. The cost function
to the replacement manager is assumed to be Cr(q, e) = Ci(0, e).
Lemma 5 (First best outcome with costly execution) The socially optimal cut-
o↵ is equal to 12 .
The proof is similar to Lemma 1 and is omitted. With costly execution, the first
best replacement cuto↵ remains at 12 . In fact, this result is very general. The optimal
cuto↵ is always 12 as long as the marginal impact of manager’s ability is positive.
The board provides two contracts, contract (w, k) to the incumbent manager and
a wage wr to the replacement manager. Denote variables with subscript r as the
variables related to the replacement manager after retention.
We first calculate the optimal contract with the replacement manager wr after
the incumbent’s departure for a given belief of period 1 e↵ort q. Given q and wr, the
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replacement manager chooses er to maximize:
1
2
⇥
(1   )q +  er
⇤
wr   1
2
e2r ) er(wr) =
1
2
 wr.
Note that the replacement manager’s e↵ort on execution is independent of q. This is
because q and e are assumed to be substitutes. The board chooses wr to maximize:
1
2
⇥
(1   )q +  er
⇤
(1  wr)) w⇤r = max
n1
2
  1   
 2
q, 0
o
.
Since q and e are substitutes by assumption, the optimal wage to the replacement
manager is weakly decreasing in the belief about q. When first period e↵ort q is large
or   is small, the board provides a contract with wr = 0 to the replacement manager.
Let ⇡(q) be the board’s expected profit under optimal contract after replacement.
⇡(q) can be calculated as follows,
⇡(q) =
8>>><>>>:
1
4
⇣
1
2 +
1  
  q
⌘2
for q  12  
2
1  
1
2(1   )q for q > 12  
2
1  
.
Next we calculate the equilibrium for a given contract (w, k) with the incumbent
manager. For a fixed contract (w, k) and belief about cuto↵ sˆ, the incumbent manager
chooses (q, e) to maximize:
1
2
[1 F1(sˆ)]
⇥
(1  )q+ e⇤w+ 1
2
[F1(sˆ)+F0(sˆ)]k  1
2
q2  1
4
[(1 F1(sˆ))+(1 F0(sˆ))]e2.
) q = (1   )1  F1(sˆ)
2
w and e =  
1  F1(sˆ)
[1  F1(sˆ)] + [1  F0(sˆ)]w.
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Note that q is decreasing in sˆ while e is increasing in sˆ. A higher equilibrium replace-
ment cuto↵ leads to a lower first period e↵ort q and higher second period e↵ort e by
the incumbent manager. The first period e↵ort q is decreasing in sˆ because a higher
cuto↵ implies lower retaining probability in period 2 and dis-incentivizes the incum-
bent manager as in the baseline model. Conditional on the fact that the incumbent
manager is retained, a higher cuto↵ yields a higher estimate of the incumbent’s ability
and thus the incumbent is willing to exert more e↵ort in period 2 (✓ and e are assumed
to be compliments). As a result, e is increasing in equilibrium cuto↵ sˆ. Similarly to
Casamatta and Guembel (2010), the incumbent is easier to motivate, but for di↵erent
reasons. The incumbent manager is easier to motivate in Casamatta and Guembel
(2010) due to his reputational concern while in our model it is due to the incumbent’s
learning of his ability. For a given wage rate w, the replacement manager chooses
er =
1
2 w while the incumbent manager chooses e =  
1 F1(sˆ)
[1 F1(sˆ)]+[1 F0(sˆ)]w >
1
2 w. The
incumbent manager learns from his retention that his ability is above average. Since
ability and e↵ort are assumed to be compliments, a higher estimate of ability implies
a higher marginal return on e↵ort. Thus, the incumbent manager exerts more e↵ort
in period 2 than the potential replacement manager given the same wage.
For a fixed contract (w, k) and belief about e↵ort (q, e), the board chooses cuto↵
sˆ to maximize:
1
2
[1  F1(sˆ)]
⇥
(1   )q +  e⇤(1  w) + 1
2
[F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)]
⇥
⇡(q)  k⇤ .
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) f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
⇥
(1   )q +  e⇤(1  w) = ⇡(q)  k.
Not every sˆ can be implemented. For instance, sˆ very close to 1 cannot be induced by
a contract. This is due to the limited liability assumption of severance pay. Extremely
high cuto↵ can only be induced if severance pay is allowed to be negative. This is
di↵erent from the baseline model. Using an aggressive replacement policy results in
a small q, making the board’s outside option very unattractive. On the other hand,
an aggressive replacement policy improves learning and makes e very high, increasing
the value of keeping the current manager. Thus, unless the board is compensated by
negative severance pay, a very aggressive replacement policy cannot be induced by a
contract subject to the limited liability constraint.
Similarly to the baseline model, the expected profit can be written as a function
of cuto↵ sˆ alone, assuming away the limited liability constraint of k,17
⇡(sˆ) =
1
8
(
(1   )2 1  F1(sˆ)
2| {z }
incentive e↵ect
+ 2
1  F1(sˆ)
[1  F1(sˆ)] + [1  F0(sˆ)]| {z }
learning e↵ect
)
·
(h⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+
1
2
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤i| {z }
selection e↵ect
+
h
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
i⇣ f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
  1
2
⌘
| {z }
commitment e↵ect
)
.
Proposition 6 (Optimal replacement policy with costly execution) 1. If   2
[0,
p
2  1), there exists ↵ such that sˆ⇤(↵) > 12 for ↵ > ↵.
2. For   2 [0, 1], there exists ↵ such that sˆ⇤(↵) < 12 for ↵ < ↵.
17The intuition can be clearly illustrated assuming that every sˆ can be induced. The limited
liability constraint of severance pay is taken into consideration in the proof of Proposition 6.
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A learning e↵ect enters into the board’s profit function along with the three afore-
mentioned e↵ects. When the information structure is su ciently noisy (↵ ! 0), the
incumbent’s learning is very slow for all s 2 (0, 1). The learning e↵ect plays a minor
role in determining the optimal replacement policy since 1 F1(sˆ)[1 F1(sˆ)]+[1 F0(sˆ)] 
2 can be
considered as a constant. Thus, entrenchment is expected to be optimal when ↵ is
su ciently small independent of the size of  .
When the information structure is su ciently informative (↵ ! 1), the incum-
bent’s learning becomes very fast. When execution becomes su ciently important,
entrenchment can be optimal to the board. When period 1 e↵ort q is su ciently
important relative to period 2 e↵ort e (i.e.,   <
p
2  1), the incentive e↵ect is more
important than the learning e↵ect in board’s contractual problem. Thus, the main
insight in the baseline model follows through and entrenchment is expected to emerge
in the optimal contract.
1.5.3 Signal of outcome instead of ability
In the baseline model, it is assumed that the board observes a signal of the incumbent
manager’s ability rather than the outcome under the incumbent’s management. Since
the signal is not related to the incumbent manager’s e↵ort, the incumbent cannot
increase his probability of retention by exerting more e↵ort. When the board receives
a signal related to e↵ort, the incumbent manager is able to increase his probability
of being retained by exerting more e↵ort.
Suppose for outcome y 2 {0, 1}, signal s is drawn from a distribution with density
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hy(·) and cdf Hy(·). Similarly, we assume
 
h1(·), h0(·)
 
satisfies Assumptions 1 -
4. The signal provides information about the expected outcome and the incumbent
manager’s ability.
The social planner chooses (sˆ, q) to maximize:
max
{sˆ,q}
1
2
q
⇥
1 H1(sˆ)
⇤
+
1
2
q
h1
2
qH1(sˆ) +
 
1  1
2
q
 
H0(sˆ)
i
  1
2
q2.
Lemma 6 (First best outcome) sˆFB = 12 and q
FB = 1+H0(
1
2 ) H1( 12 )
2+H0(
1
2 ) H1( 12 )
in the first best
outcome.
The proof is similar to Lemma 1 and is omitted. Given e↵ort level q, the Bayesian
update of the incumbent manager’s ability is
'(sˆ, q) =
1
2qh1(sˆ) +
1
2(1  q)h0(sˆ)
1
2qh1(sˆ) +
 
1  12q
 
h0(sˆ)
.
It can be verified that '(12 , q) =
1
2 independent of q and ↵. Thus it is socially optimal
to replace the incumbent manager if and only if the posterior belief of his ability falls
below the prior.
Given a contract (w, k) and belief about replacement cuto↵ sˆ, the manager chooses
q to maximize:
1
2
q[1 H1(sˆ)]w +
(
1
2
qH1(sˆ) +
✓
1  1
2
q
◆
H0(sˆ)
)
k   1
2
q2.
The manager’s best response is:
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q = max
⇢
1
2
[1 H1(sˆ)]w   1
2
[H0(sˆ) H1(sˆ)]k, 0
 
.
Unlike the baseline model, here the incumbent manager is directly dis-incentivized by
severance pay. An increase in severance pay increases the opportunity cost of exerting
e↵ort and leads directly to a decrease in e↵ort. If the severance pay is high enough,
the incumbent manager exerts no e↵ort at all and is willing to be fired. Under this
extension, severance pay is a double-edged sword. By the direct e↵ect (better outside
option if the incumbent manager is replaced), e↵ort decreases. By the indirect e↵ect
(better job security with lower equilibrium replacement cuto↵), e↵ort increases. The
design of the optimal contract should take this non-trivial incentive of k on q into
consideration.
Fixed (w, k) and q, the board chooses sˆ to maximize:
1
2
q
⇥
1 H1(sˆ)
⇤
(1  w) +
(
1
2
qH1(sˆ) +
✓
1  1
2
q
◆
H0(sˆ)
)✓
1
2
q   k
◆
.
The board’s indi↵erence condition is:
1
2qh1(sˆ)
1
2qh1(sˆ) +
 
1  12q
 
h0(sˆ)
(1  w) = 1
2
q   k.
sˆ is the solution to ⇣(sˆ, q) = max
n
min
  1
2 q k
1 w , 1
 
, 0
o
, where ⇣(sˆ, q) is the estimate of
the outcome under the incumbent’s management at sˆ given q,
⇣(sˆ, q) ⌘
1
2qh1(sˆ)
1
2qh1(sˆ) +
 
1  12q
 
h0(sˆ)
.
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It is di cult to write the expected profit as a function of sˆ alone because q is now
a↵ected by (w, k) directly and by equilibrium cuto↵ sˆ indirectly. However, we can
still discuss the optimal replacement policy under extreme information structure.
Multiple equilibria may exist for some contract (w, k) because incentive on e↵ort
q is not monotone in k as in the baseline model. For the same reason, equilibria may
not be Pareto-ranked. We further assume that the equilibrium most favorable to the
board is selected when multiple equilibria exist.
Proposition 7 (Optimal replacement policy) There exist ↵ and ↵ such that,
1. sˆ⇤(↵) > 12 for ↵ > ↵;
2. sˆ⇤(↵) < 12 for ↵ < ↵.
When the information structure is su ciently noisy (↵ ! 0), H0(s) is very close
to H1(s) for s 2 [0, 1]. The direct negative e↵ect of severance pay on e↵ort is small
and the model is back to the baseline in the limit. Knowing that the board has noisy
monitoring technology, the incumbent manager has little incentive to manipulate the
realization of the signal. Entrenchment is expected to be optimal when ↵ is su ciently
small.
When the information structure is su ciently informative (↵ ! 1), the magni-
tude of the direct negative e↵ect of k (i.e., 12 [H0(sˆ)   H1(sˆ)]) is very large. Under
this scenario, the board can simply avoid the disadvantage of k by setting k = 0.
Moreover, this does not contradict the possibility of obtaining a net commitment
gain. In fact, we can construct a contract with high wage and zero severance pay
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that yields anti-entrenchment and dominates all possible contracts that yield en-
trenchment. Thus, anti-entrenchment emerges in the optimal contract as the board’s
information structure becomes su ciently informative.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper explores how the problem of motivating the incumbent manager to exert
e↵ort and keeping the flexibility to choose a high ability manager interacts with the
equilibrium replacement policy. We focus on the situation where the board observes
a non-contractible signal after the incumbent manager exerts e↵ort and solve for the
optimal contract. We show that the information technology that the board uses to
assess the incumbent manager’s ability is an important determinant of the optimal
contract and of managerial turnover. Unlike the existing literature on managerial
turnover, which aims to rationalize entrenchment, we show that anti-entrenchment
can also be optimal for shareholders in some situations. This result is robust to
allowing costly execution and the possibility that the board observes a signal of the
outcome rather than incumbent manager’s ability. The model highlights the board’s
monitoring technology as an important determinant of managerial turnover.
There are several interesting questions that can be pursued using the stylized
model introduced in this paper. For future research, it would be interesting to en-
dogenize the informativeness of the board’s monitoring technology. In practice, in-
formativeness is often the choice of the board. Some boards actively monitor their
CEOs while some tend to be passive monitors. Endogenizing the board’s monitoring
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technology could help us better understand the di↵erences of monitoring intensity
that occur across industries.
Another intriguing research avenue would be to incorporate voluntary departure
into the model by allowing the possibility that manager possesses private information
about the firm’s profit. As Inderst and Mueller (2010) point out, managers sometimes
have private information about a firm’s performance. In such scenarios, the optimal
contract needs to provide incentives for the incumbent manager to step down volun-
tarily. It would be interesting to build a unified model with both forced departure
and voluntary departure and study the interaction between them.
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Chapter 2
Life Settlement Market with
Overconfident Policyholders
This chapter is a joint work with Hanming Fang.
2.1 Introduction
Life insurance is a prevalent long-term contract for people to keep their dependents
from economic disaster when the policyholders die. The life insurance is a large and
growing industry. According to Life Insurance Marketing and Research Association
International (LIMRA international), 70% of U.S. households owned some type of life
insurance in 2010. U.S. families purchased $2.8 trillion of insurance coverage in 2013
and the total life insurance coverage in the US was $19.7 trillion by the end of 2013.
The average face amount of the individual life insurance policies purchased increased
from $81 thousand in 1993 to $165 thousand in 2013 at an average annual growth
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rate of 3.56%1.
An important feature of the the life insurance market is that policyholders lapse
their policies before the period of coverage and receive the cash surrender value (CSV)
that is a substantially small fraction (typically 3-5%) of the policy’s face value2.
Policyholders may lapse the contract if they lose the demand for life insurance (i.e.,
lost of bequest motive) or need for liquidity (i.e., negative income shock).3 Recently,
the secondary market for life insurance – life settlement market – emerged and o↵ers
the policyholders the option of selling their unwanted policy for more than the CSV.
Although the life settlement market is in its infancy, it draws attentions from the
life insurance firms who put intensive e↵ort into lobbying to prohibit the securitization
of life settlement contracts.4 They argue that the life insurance contract is designed
taking into consideration of the fact that a fraction of policyholders lapse the contract
without receiving the death benefit. The existence of the settlement market forces the
insurance firms to pay death benefits on more policies than expected, which will lead
to higher premiums for policyholders in the long run and hurt consumers eventually.
The life settlement industry has been working hard to justify its existence, empha-
sizing its role of enhancing liquidity to policyholders.5 It is interesting to note that
the life settlement industry has gained some success recently. In 2010, the General
1See American Council of Life Insurers (2014).
2See http://www.lisa.org/content/13/What-is-a-Life-Settlement.aspx/
3Fang and Kung (2012) show that income shocks are relatively more important than bequest
motive in explaining lapsation when policyholders are young. As policyholders age, bequest motive
shocks become more important.
4See Martin (2010) for detailed dicussions of life insurance and life settlement market.
5As mentioned in Martin (2010): “In 2008, the executive of the life settlement industry’s national
trade organizaton testifies to the Florida O ce of Insurance Regulation that the ‘secondary market
for life insurance has brought great benefits to consumers, unlocking the value of life insurance
policies.”
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Assembly in Kentucky passed a bill requiring insurers to inform policyholders who are
considering surrendering their policy that the settlement is a potential alternative.6
Should the life settlement industry be banned? To resolve this theoretically and
empirically interesting question, it would be useful to understand the role of the life
settlement market and its impact on policyholders’ welfare. In this paper we extend
the models of Daily, Hendel, and Lizzeri (2008) and Fang and Kung (2010) to study
the welfare implication of the life settlement market by assuming that consumers are
overconfident about the probability of losing their bequest motives at the time they
purchase the contract.7 Fang and Kung (2010) show that when lapsation is due to lost
of bequest motive, introducing life settlement market reduces consumer welfare. We
prove that this result depends on the full rationality assumption on policyholders.
When policyholders exhibit overconfidence, the presence of the settlement market
provides them a channel to correct their mistakes and undercut the loss due to their
misperception. This new role of the settlement market generates a potential welfare
gain which is not present when consumers are fully rational and may lead to increase
in consumer welfare in equilibrium. Our results may contribute to the debate over
banning life settlement market.
This paper is related to the growing life insurance literature. In a seminal paper,
6Similar requirements exist in Maine, Oregon, Washington (See Martin, 2010) and U.K (See
Janua´rio and Naik, 2014).
7Many studies document that people are unrealistically optimistic about future life events. For
instance, Weinstein (1980) finds strong evidence of over-optimism in a lab experiment setting with
258 college students. Subjects overwhelmingly predict themselves to be better than a median indi-
vidual regarding positive events and below average regarding negative events. Robb et al. (2004)
also detects underestimation of risk among patients who participated in cancer examination. They
find that the self perceived risk is lower than the actual risk of colorectal cancer determined by
flexible sigmoidoscopy screening.
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Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) use a two-period model to analyze the role of commitment
on long-term life insurance contract. In their model, risk-neutral life insurance firms
compete to o↵er contracts to risk averse consumers who are subject to mortality
risk. Consumers’ health status may change over time and thus face reclassification
risk . Insurance firms is able to commit to contractual terms while consumers can
lapse the contract in the second period, lacking commitment power (i.e., one-sided
commitment). They prove that the equilibrium contract is front-loaded : consumers
are o↵ered a contract with first period premium that is higher than actuarially fair
in exchange for reclassification risk in the second period. Daily et al. (2008) and
Fang and Kung (2010) investigate this problem further by introducing a settlement
market and analyze its e↵ect on the equilibrium contract and consumer welfare. In
their models, policyholders may lose bequest motive in the second period, facilitating
lapsation and the demand for the settlement market. Using a model similar to Hendel
and Lizzeri (2003), Fang and Kung (2010) show that the shape of the equilibrium
contract is fundamentally changed in the presence of the settlement market. Instead
of flat premiums, a contract with premium discounts is o↵ered in the second period.
They conclude that consumer welfare is reduced in the presence of the settlement
market. In recent independent research, Gottlieb and Smetters (2014) investigate the
equilibrium life insurance contracts where lapsation is motivated by a negative income
shock. Similar to our paper, consumers are overconfident in the sense that they place
zero probability on the event of experiencing the liquidity shock. Unlike Hendel and
Lizzeri (2003), the equilibrium contract is front-loaded because insurance firms have
incentives to make the policy look better given policyholders’ misperception of the
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probability of lapsing the contract. They show that the presence of the settlement
market would increase consumer welfare if lapsation is due to liquidity shock.
This paper also belongs to the strand of literature on behavioral contract theory.8
Most papers assume consumers exhibit some type of behavioral bias and investigate
how firms design contracts accordingly. For instance, De la Rosa (2011) and Santos-
Pinto (2008) study the incentive contract in a principal-agent model of moral hazard
when agent is overconfident. Grubb (2009) proposes a model of contracting over-
confident consumers in US cellular phone services market and confirms evidence of
overconfidence. In the context of insurance market, Sandroni and Squintani (2007)
modify the textbook Rothschild-Stiglitz model to study the equilibrium contract by
assuming that part of the insurees are overconfident about their risk types. They find
that when a significant fraction of individuals are overconfident, compulsory insurance
serves as a transfer of income between di↵erent types of agents. Their results have
much di↵erent implications than Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) on government inter-
vention in insurance market. Spinnewijn (2012) studies the optimal unemployment
insurance contract under perfect competition where the insuree has misperception on
the probability of finding a job. Our paper contributes to this strand of literature by
pointing out the role of a secondary market in alleviating the negative consequences
caused by consumers’ behavioral bias.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline
model of dynamic life insurance without the life settlement market when policyholders
exhibit overconfidence and characterizes the set of equilibrium contracts. Section
8See Ko˝szegi (2014) for a comprehensive survey on this topic.
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3 incorporates the settlement market into the baseline model. Section 4 studies
the welfare e↵ect of the settlement market under di↵erent levels of policyholders’
overconfidence. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2.2 The Baseline Model without the Settlement
Market
In this section, we propose a model of dynamic life insurance slightly modified from
Fang and Kung (2010), Daily, Hendel, and Lizzeri (2008) and Hendel and Lizzeri
(2003).
2.2.1 The Model
Consider a perfectly competitive life insurance market with insurance buyers (policy-
holders) and sellers (life insurance firms). The market operates for two periods.
Income, health and preference. The policyholder receives an income of y g in
the first period and y+g in the second period, where g 2 [0, y) is a measure of income
growth. In the first period, the policyholder has a death probability of p1 2 (0, 1),
which is common knowledge between policyholders and insurance firms. The dealth
probability is interpreted as the health status of the policyholder. In the second
period, the mortality risk p2 2 [0, 1] is randomly drawn from a distribution with
continuous density  (·) and corresponding cdf  (·). Health status p2 is not known in
the first period when the policyholder purchases the insurance and is symmetrically
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learned by the insurance firms and the policyholders at the beginning of the second
period.
A policyholder has two sources of utility: utility from his own consumption if he
is alive and utility from his dependent’s consumption if he dies. If the policyholder
is alive and consumes c   0, his utility is given by u(c). If the policyholder dies,
his utility is given by v(c), where c is the consumption of his dependent. We assume
that both u(·) and v(·) are strictly increasing, twice di↵erentiable and strictly concave.
Furthermore, we assume that u(·) and v(·) satisfy the Inada conditions: limc!0 u0(c) =
1, limc!0 v0(c) =1 and limc!1 v0(c) = 0.
Bequest motives and overconfidence. A policyholder does not lose his be-
quest motive in the first period. However, the policyholder may lose his bequest
motive with probability q 2 (0, 1) at the beginning of period 2. If the policyholder
loses his bequest motive, he no longer derives utility from his dependent’s consump-
tion. Under such scenario, his utility is u(·) if he is alive and some constant normalized
to zero if he dies. The policyholder believes his probability of losing bequest motive
is q˜  q. When q˜ = q, the policyholder is rational and the model degenerates to
Fang and Kung (2010). When q˜ < q, the policyholder exhibits overconfidence and
underestimates the probability of losing his bequest motive. Both q˜ and q are as-
sumed to be common knowledge. For ease of our exposition, denote q q˜q by  . The
variable   2 [0, 1] is a measure of policyholders’ overconfidence. In particular, when
  = 0, policyholder is fully rational and forms correct belief about q. When   = 1,
a policyholder is extremely overconfident and never expects himself to lose bequest
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motive in the second period.
Timing, commitment and contracts. At the beginning of the first period,
the consumer may choose to purchase a long-term life insurance contract after he
learns the period-1 health status p1. A long-term insurance contract is in the form of
h(Q1, F1), (Q2(p2), F2(p2)) : p2 2 [0, 1]i, where hQ1, F1i specifies a premium and face
value for the first period, and hQ2(p2), F2(p2)i specifies the corresponding premium
and face value for each health status p2 2 [0, 1] for the second period. Note that the
second period premium and face value are state dependent.
At the end of the first period, a fraction p1 of policyholders die and their depen-
dents receive the face value F1. The remaining policyholders continue to period 2,
where a perfectly competitive spot market exists. We assume one-sided commitment:
insurance firms can commit to future premiums and face values while the policyhold-
ers are free to opt out of the contract. After the policyholder learns the period-2
health status p2, he can choose to continue with the long-term contract purchased in
the first period, or terminate the contract and purchase a spot contract, or just lapse
the contract and stay uninsured in the absence of the life settlement market.
2.2.2 Equilibrium contracts
We characterize the equilibrium contract without the settlement market. Competition
among the life insurance firms drives their profits to zero in the long run. Therefore
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the long-term equilibrium contract h(Q1, F1), (Q2(p2), F2(p2)) : p2 2 [0, 1]i solves:
max[u(y   g  Q1) + p1v(F1)] (2.1)
+ (1  p1)
Z 1
0
{(1  q˜)[u(y + g  Q2(p2))) + p2v(F2(p2))] + q˜u(y + g)}d (p2)
s.t. (Q1   p1F1) + (1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
0
[Q2(p2)  p2F2(p2)]d (p2) = 0, (2.2)
Q2(p2)  p2F2(p2)  0 for all p2 2 [0, 1], (2.3)
Q2(p2)   0 for all p2 2 [0, 1]. (2.4)
Note that the set of equilibrium contracts maximizes policyholders’ expected per-
ceived utility instead of the utility based on the actual probability of losing bequest
motive.9 Constraint (2.2) is the zero-profit condition that captures the competition
in the primary market. Constraint (2.3) is the no-lapsation condition for policyhold-
ers whose bequest motives remain in period 2.10 The intuition is as follows. For any
contract hQ2(p2), F2(p2)i in the second period, p2F2(p2) Q2(p2) is the actuarial value
of the contract for health state p2. Since the spot market is perfectly competitive,
the actuarial value of the spot contract is zero. In order to avoid the policyhold-
ers to lapse the long-term contract and substitute for a spot contract, the primary
insurance firms have to provide a contract with actuarial value no less than 0, i.e.,
p2F2(p2) Q2(p2)   0. Finally, constraint (2.4) simply states that the second period
premium for any health status can not be negative.11
9Policyholders’ expected utility according to the correct probability of losing beqeust motive is
used when we evaluate the welfare e↵ect of introducing the life settlement market.
10For a formal argument of constraint (2.3), see Hendel and Lizzeri (2003).
11The non-negativity constraint of the period 2 face value F2(p2) never binds by the Inada condi-
tion of v(·).
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The first order conditions for problem (2.1) with respect to Q1, F1, Q2(p2) F2(p2)
yield:
u0(y   g  Q1) = µ, (2.5a)
v0(F1) = µ, (2.5b)
(1  q˜)u0(y + g  Q2(p2)) = (1  q)µ+  (p2) +  (p2)
(1  p1) (p2) , (2.5c)
(1  q˜)v0(F2(p2)) = (1  q)µ+  (p2)
(1  p1) (p2) , (2.5d)
where µ,  (p2) and  (p2) are the Lagrange multipliers for constraint (2.2), (2.3) and
(2.4), with µ > 0,  (p2)  0 and  (p2)   0 satisfying complementary slackness
conditions:
 (p2)[Q2(p2)  p2F2(p2)] = 0, (2.6a)
 (p2)Q2(p2) = 0. (2.6b)
The first order conditions (2.5) imply that:
u0(y   g  Q1) = v0(F1). (2.7)
In equilibrium, the marginal utility of policyholder’s consumption is equal to the
marginal utility of his dependent’s consumption in period 1. This is referred to as
the full-event insurance in Fang and Kung (2010).
To characterize the equilibrium contracts, we follow Fang and Kung (2010) and
divide the support of the second period health states p2 into two subsets B and
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NB: for p2 2 B, the no-lapsation constraint (2.3) binds; for p2 2 NB, the no-
lapsation constraint (2.3) does not bind. It would also be useful to define the fair
premium and face amount for the full-event second period insurance contract with
health state p2 2 [0, 1], denoted by QFI2 (p2) and F FI2 (p2) respectively, as the solution
to the following pair of equations:
u0(y + g  QFI2 (p2)) = v0(F FI2 (p2)), (2.8a)
QFI2 (p2)  p2F FI2 (p2) = 0. (2.8b)
This is indeed the equilibrium spot contract with health state p2 in period 2.12
Lemma 7 (Fang and Kung 2010) If p2 2 B and p02 2 NB, then p2 < p02, Q2(p2) 
Q2(p02) and F2(p2)   F2(p02).
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1 in Fang and Kung (2010). Lemma 7
indicates that there exists a threshold p⇤2 such that p2 2 B if p2 < p⇤2 and p2 2 NB if
p2 > p⇤2.
Lemma 8 If there exists one health state pi2 6= 0 such that Q2(pi2) = 0, then Q2(p2) =
0 for all p2 2 [0, 1].
Lemma 8 greatly narrows down the set of period 2 equilibrium premiums to two
possibilities: either Q2(p2) > 0 or Q2(p2) = 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1]. If Q2(pi2) > 0 for
12The second period spot contract hQ2(p2), F2(p2)i sovles maxu(y + g   Q2(p2)) + p2v(F2(p2))
subject to Q2(p2)  p2F2(p2) = 0, which leads to the same conditions as in (2.8).
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some pi2,  (p2) = 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1] and policyholders obtain full-event insurance in
period 2 for all health states p2:
u0(y + g  Q2(p2)) = v0(F2(p2)) for all p2 2 (0, 1]. (2.9)
If Q2(pi2) = 0 for some p
i
2 6= 0,  (p2) = 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1]; together with the first
order conditions (2.5b) and (2.5d), we must have:
(1  q˜)v0(F2(p2)) = (1  q)v0(F1) for all p2 2 (0, 1]. (2.10)
If p⇤2 = 1, the no-lapsation condition (2.3) binds for all period-2 health states,
i.e., Q2(p2)  p2F2(p2) = 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1]. Meanwhile, the Inada condition of v(·)
implies that F2(p2) > 0 for all p2. Therefore Q2(p2) = p2F2(p2) > 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1],
which in turn implies that conditions (2.9) hold. Thus, the equilibrium contract in
period 2 is the set of spot contracts.
If p⇤2 = 0, we must have:
Q2(p2) = 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1]. (2.11)
To see this, suppose to the contrary that Q2(p2) > 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1]. The first order
conditions (2.5) imply that u0(y+ g Q2(p2)) = v0(F2(p2)) = 1 q1 q˜u0(y  g Q1) for all
p2 2 (0, 1]. Thus, F2(p2) and Q2(p2) remain constant for all p2 2 (0, 1]. When p2 is
su ciently small, Q2(p2)  p2F2(p2) is strictly positive, contradicting (2.3). Threfore
the set of equilibrium contracts is fully characterized by (2.2), (2.7), (2.10) and (2.11).
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If 0 < p⇤2 < 1, the no-lapsation constraint (2.3) binds and  (p2) = 0
13 for p2 < p⇤2.
Thus, u0(y+ g Q2(p2)) = v0(F2(p2)) and hQ2(p2), F2(p2)i = hQFI2 (p2), F FI2 (p2)i. For
p2 > p⇤2, p2 2 NB and  (p2) = 0, which implies that F2(p2) must remain constant
by the first order condition (2.5d). Since Q2(p2) > 0 for p < p⇤2,  (p2) = 0 for all
p2 2 (0, 1]. This implies that u0(y + g   Q2(p2)) = v0(F2(p2)) for all p2 2 (0, 1].
Thus, the second period equilibrium premium Q2(p2) for p2 > p⇤2 is front-loaded (i.e.,
Q2(p2) < QFI2 (p2)) and remains constant. In equilibrium, the insurance firms charge
the policyholders a low premium for health state p2 > p⇤2 relative to the fair premium
and insure the policyholders against reclassification risk via “level premiums”. The
next lemma characterizes the equilibrium contract at p2 = p⇤2.
Lemma 9 Suppose p⇤2 2 (0, 1). The equilibrium contract at p2 = p⇤2 solves:
Q2(p
⇤
2) = Q
FI
2 (p
⇤
2), (2.12)
(1  q˜)u0(y + g  QFI2 (p⇤2)) = (1  q)u0(y   g  Q1). (2.13)
The proof of Lemma 9 replicates that of Lemma 2 in Fang and Kung (2010) and
is omitted. When p⇤2 2 (0, 1), the equilibrium second period premiums Q2(p2) must
satisfy
Q2(p2) =
8>>><>>>:
QFI2 (p2) if p2  p⇤2
QFI2 (p
⇤
2) if p2 > p
⇤
2
, (2.14)
and the set of equilibrium contracts is fully characterized by (2.2), (2.7), (2.9) and
13Because F2(p2) > 0 by the Inada condition of v(·), it follows immediately that Q2(p2) =
p2F2(p2) > 0 for p2 2 (0, p⇤2).
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(2.14).
Lemma 10 (Period-2 equilibrium premiums) There exists a threshold q 2 (0, 1)
such that:
1. if q < q, Q2(p2) > 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1] and   2 [0, 1].
2. if q   q, there exists a threshold  (q) such that
(a) if   <  (q), Q2(p2) > 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1];
(b) if   >  (q), Q2(p2) = 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1].
When   = 0, the non-negativity constraint of the second period premium Q2(p2)
never binds (i.e.  (p2) = 0).14 Hence policyholders always obtain full-event insurance
in period 2 when they have correct belief about the probability of losing bequest mo-
tives. This result does not always hold when policyholders exhibit behavioral bias.
In particular, for su ciently high probability of losing bequest motive and overconfi-
dence level, policyholders no longer obtain full-event insurance in period 2. Insurance
firms instead o↵er contracts with zero premiums for all health states in period 2 and
fully insure against reclassification risk. The intuition is as follows. Firstly, given
that policyholders are rational (i.e.   = 0), increasing q lowers equilibrium premi-
ums in period 2 for all health states p2. The variable 1   q can be interpreted as
the cost for life insurance firms to provide long-term insurance contracts. When q
increases, the insurance firms face a lower probability of paying the death benefits,
which leads to a net profit if the set of equilibrium contract remains the same. From
14See Lemma B1 for the proof.
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the perfect competition assumption, these profits are passed onto the policyholders
in terms of a higher degree of reclassification risk in period 2: more health states
are o↵ered actuarially favorable premiums (i.e. a higher p⇤2). Secondly, fixing q, the
second period premiums decrease for all health states when policyholders become
more overconfident. This is because under such scenario the policyholders care more
about their dependents’ utility in period 2 as well as the expected utility generated
by the period 2 contracts. As a result, the insurance firms respond by raising the first
period premium and lowering the second period premiums. When these two e↵ects
are strong enough (i.e. for su ciently high q and  ), contracts with zero period-2
premiums can emerge in equilibrium.
The above discussions are summarized below:
Proposition 8 (Equilibrium contracts) The set of equilibrium contracts satisfies
the following properties:
1. All policyholders receive full-event insurance in period 1.
2. There is a period-2 threshold health state p⇤2 2 [0, 1] such that p2 2 B if p2 < p⇤2
and p2 2 NB if p2 > p⇤2.
3. (a) If p⇤2 = 0, all policyholders lose full-event insurance in period 2. The set of
equilibrium contracts solves (2.2), (2.7), (2.10) and (2.11).
(b) If 0 < p⇤2 < 1, all policyholders receive full-event insurance in period 2.
The set of equilibrium contracts solves (2.2), (2.7), (2.9) and (2.14).
(c) If p⇤2 = 1, the equilibrium contract is the set of spot contracts.
54
Figure 2.1: Equilibrium Period-2 Premium Profiles without the Settlement Market.
4. When q and   are su ciently large, p⇤2 = 0. Policyholders are fully insured
against reclassification risk, receiving zero premiums in period 2 for all health
states.
2.2.3 E↵ect of the policyholder’s overconfidence
Proposition 9 (Comparative statics of equilibrium contracts) Suppose  ˆ <
 . Let hFˆ1, Qˆ1i and hF1, Q1i be the equilibrium contract for the first period with  ˆ
and   respectively. If 0 < pˆ⇤2 < 1, then Fˆ1 > F1, Qˆ1 < Q1 and pˆ
⇤
2 > p
⇤
2.
When the level of policyholders’ overconfidence increases from  ˆ to  , the first
period premium will be higher and a higher degree of reclassification risk is o↵ered
in the second period. Figure 2.1 illustrates the equilibrium period 2 premiums under
 ˆ and  . The intuition is as follows. As policyholders become more overconfident,
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they place more weight on the expected utility from the set of period 2 contracts
and prefer a more actuarially favorable period 2 contract terms. To maximize the
perceived expected utility of the policyholders, the life insurance firms respond by
lowering the period 2 premiums and covering a higher degree of reclassification risk
in the second period. Fixing q, this implies the insurance firms will su↵er a greater
loss in period 2. This loss is compensated by a more front-loading contract in the first
period in equilibrium. This argument is reminisce of Gottlieb and Smetters (2014):
overconfidence leads to (more) front-loading life insurance contract in equilibrium.
Once the equilibrium contract h(Q1, F1), (Q2(p2), F2(p2)) : p2 2 [0, 1]i is pinned
down, consumer welfare can be calculated accordingly. Denote the consumer welfare
with actual probability of losing bequest motive q and overconfidence level   by
W (q, ). Then
W (q, ) := [u(y   g  Q1) + p1v(F1)]
+ (1  p1)
Z 1
0
{(1  q)[u(y + g  Q2(p2))) + p2v(F2(p2))] + qu(y + g)}d (p2).
Note that q instead of q˜ enters into the calculation of consumer welfare.
Proposition 10 (Welfare implication of overconfidence) Fixing q 2 (0, 1),W (q, )
is weakly decreasing in  .
Consumer welfare is weakly reduced if consumers become more overconfident. When
consumers have unbiased belief, the socially optimal contract and the set of equi-
librium contracts proposed by the life insurance firms coincide. Therefore consumer
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welfare is maximized. However, when consumers have biased belief about the prob-
ability of losing bequest motive, the set of equilibrium contracts departs from the
socially optimal contract. With biased belief, policyholders obtain a higher expected
utility in period 2 at the cost of obtaining a lower period 1 expected utility. A higher
behavioral bias leads to more deviation from the socially optimal contract and the
welfare loss in the first period exceeds the welfare gain in the second period. Thus,
consumer welfare is decreasing in the level of policyholders’ overconfidence.
2.3 Introducing the Life Settlement Market
In this section, we introduce the life settlement market at the beginning of period 2 to
the baseline model. After the policyholders learn the period 2 health status p2 and the
realization of their bequest motives, they can sell the contracts to the settlement firms
before the death uncertainty is realized. Instead of lapsing the contract, policyholders
that lose their bequest motives in period 2 have a better option: they can now sell
their contracts to the settlement market and receive a fraction   2 (0, 1) of the
actuarial value of the contract. The actuarial value of a life insurance contract is
the expected cash benefit that is paid by the contract, as opposed to being paid out
of pocket by the policyholders. The life settlement firms continue to pay the second
period premiums for policyholders. In return, the life settlement firms become the
beneficiaries of such policies and collect all the death benefits from life insurance firms
once policyholders die by the end of period 2.
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2.3.1 Equilibrium contracts with the settlement market
The presence of the settlement market shapes equilibrium life insurance contract
in a di↵erent way. Without the settlement market, life insurance firms can avoid
paying death benefits if policyholders lose their bequest motives. This is because
lapsing the contract is the optimal choice for policyholders if they lose their bequest
motives in the absence of settlement market. However, with the settlement market,
they can cash out a fraction of the actuarial value of the contract by selling the
contract to the settlement firms. Thus, the life insurance firms have to pay the death
benefits no matter policyholders lose bequest motives or not. As will be clear later,
this di↵erence fundamentally varies the way insurance firms provide the long-term
insurance contracts in equilibrium.
The life insurance firms solve the following maximization problem to provide the
equilibrium contracts:
max[u(y   g  Q1s) + p1v(F1s)] (2.15)
+ (1  p1)
Z 1
0
8>>><>>>:(1  q˜)
"
u(y + g  Q2s(p2)))
+p2v(F2s(p2))
#
+ q˜u(y + g +  V2s(p2))
9>>>=>>>; d (p2)
s.t. (Q1s   p1F1s) + (1  p1)
Z 1
0
[Q2s(p2)  p2F2s(p2)]d (p2) = 0, (2.16)
Q2s(p2)  p2F2s(p2)  0 for all p2 2 [0, 1], (2.17)
Q2s(p2)   0 for all p2 2 [0, 1], (2.18)
where V2s(p2) ⌘ p2F2s(p2)   Q2s(p2) is the actuarial value of the period 2 contract
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with health status p2. From the no-lapsation condition (2.17), V2s(p2) is always non-
negative. The first order conditions with respect to Q1s, F1s, Q2s(p2) F2s(p2) are:
u0(y   g  Q1s) = µ, (2.19a)
v0(F1s) = µ, (2.19b)
(1  q˜)u0(y + g  Q2s(p2)) +  q˜u0(y + g +  V2s(p2)) = µ+  (p2) +  (p2)
(1  p1) (p2) , (2.19c)
(1  q˜)v0(F2s(p2)) +  q˜u0(y + g +  V2s(p2)) = µ+  (p2)
(1  p1) (p2) . (2.19d)
Note that q enters into neither the zero-profit condition (2.16) nor the first order
conditions (2.19). Hence, fixing q˜, the set of equilibrium contracts is independent of q.
This is because life insurance firms have to pay the face amount when policyholders
die in period 2 no matter they lose bequest motives or not. Therefore the life insurance
firms does not take into account the actual probability of losing bequest motive when
they maximize policyholders’ perceived utility.
Lemma 11 Fixing (q, ) 2 [0, 1)⇥ [0, 1], Q2s(p2) > 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1].
Lemma 11 states that the non-negativity condition of Q2s(p2) never binds. This
result provides a stark contrast to Lemma 10. When the life settlement market is
not present, contracts with zero premiums in the second period can be sustained in
equilibrium when q and   are su ciently large because insurance firms expect a large
fraction of policyholders at the beginning of period 2 (i.e. q ) to lapse the contract
due to their misperception and the death benefits will not be paid. However, in the
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presence of the settlement market, providing a set of contracts with zero premiums
in period 2 is too costly for the insurance firms because the settlement firms collect
all the death benefits from policyholders that lapse their contracts.
Lemma 11 implies immediately that  (p2) = 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1]; together with
the first order conditions (2.19), we have:
u0(y   g  Q1s) = v0(F1s) (2.20)
u0(y + g  Q2s(p2)) = v0(F2s(p2)) for all p2 2 (0, 1]. (2.21)
Thus, in the presence of the life settlement market, policyholders always obtain full-
event insurance in both period 1 and all health states in period 2.
The characterization of the equilibrium contracts replicates that in Fang and Kung
(2010) by replacing the variable q with q˜. Similar to the case without the settlement
market, all the period 2 health states can be divided into two subsets Bs and NBs
depending on whether the no-lapsation constraint binds.
Lemma 12 (Fang and Kung 2010) If p2 2 Bs and p02 2 NBs, then p2 < p02 and
Q2(p2) < Q2(p02).
The proof is the same as in Fang and Kung (2010) and hence omitted. Lemma
12 implies that there is a threshold p⇤2s such that p2 2 Bs if p2 < p⇤2s and p2 2 NBs if
p2 > p⇤2s.
Lemma 13 For all (q, ) 2 [0, 1)⇥ [0, 1], p⇤2s   p1.
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Lemma 13 rules out the possibility that p⇤2s = 0 (p
⇤
2s   p1 > 0). If p⇤2s = 1, the set
of equilibrium contracts in period 2 is the set of spot contracts. The following lemma
characterizes the period-2 premiums Q2s(p2) as a function of p⇤2s if p
⇤
2s < 1.
Lemma 14 If p⇤2s 2 (0, 1), the equilibrium period 2 premiums Q2s(p2) satisfy:
1. for p2  p⇤2s, Q2s(p2) = QFI2 (p2);
2. for p2 > p⇤2s, Q2s(p2) solves:
(1  q˜)u0(y + g  Q2s(p2)) +  q˜u0(y + g +  V2s(p2))
= (1  q˜)u0(y + g  QFI2 (p⇤2s)) +  q˜u0(y + g). (2.22)
By Lemma 14, the set of period-2 contracts is fully characterized by p⇤2s alone.
Moreover, it can be proved from (2.22) that both Q2s(p2) and V2s(p2) are strictly
increasing in p2.15 From the first order conditions (2.19a), (2.19c) and Lemma 14,
the period 1 premium Q1s is the solution to:
u0(y   g  Q1s) = (1  q˜)u0(y + g  QFI2 (p⇤2s)) +  q˜u0(y + g). (2.23)
To characterize the equilibrium insurance contract, it remains to pin down p⇤2s,
which is determined by the zero-profit condition (2.16). The following proposition
summarizes the above discussions.
Proposition 11 (Equilibrium contracts with the settlement market) The set
of equilibrium contracts satisfies the following properties:
15See the proof of Proposition 3 in Fang and Kung (2010).
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1. All policyholders receive full-event insurance in period 1 and 2 as defined by
(2.20) and (2.21).
2. There exists a threshold p⇤2s 2 [p1, 1] such that p2 2 Bs if p2 < p⇤2s and p2 2 NBs
if p2 > p⇤2s.
3. (a) If p2s < 1, the set of equilibrium contracts is determined by (2.16), (2.20),
(2.21) and Lemma 14. Moreover, Q2s(p2) and V2s(p2) are strictly increas-
ing in p2.
(b) If p2s = 1, the equilibrium contract is the set of spot contracts.
In the presence of the settlement market, the life insurance firms no long provide
flat premiums in period 2. Instead, they provide partial insurance against reclassifi-
cation risk in equilibrium. The set of period-2 equilibrium contract is in the form of
premium discounts relative to the spot market contracts. Policyholders with higher
mortality risk are charged higher premiums. The equilibrium contract is still in favor
of higher p2 in the sense the that policyholders with higher p2 are o↵ered contracts
with higher actuarial values.
2.3.2 E↵ect of overconfidence with settlement market
Proposition 12 Suppose  ˆ <  . Let (Fˆ1s, Qˆ1s) and (F1s, Q1s) be the equilibrium
contract in period 1 with  ˆ and   respectively. Then Fˆ1s > F1s and Qˆ1s < Q1s.
When consumers become more overconfident, the life insurance firms respond by
o↵ering a set of contracts with a higher degree of front-loading (i.e. a higher premium
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium Period-2 Premium Profiles with the Settlement Market: Case
I.
and lower face value) in the first period. The intuition is similar to that of Proposition
9. When policyholders become more overconfident, they demand actuarially more
favorable contract terms in period 2 in expectation. To keep budget balanced, the
first period premium increases as a result.
Di↵erent from Proposition 9, we can not obtain clean comparative statics on the
threshold p⇤2s with respect to  , i.e., increasing   can not guarantee a higher degree of
reclassification risk (i.e. lower p⇤2s). Figure 2.2 and 2.3 depict the change of equilibrium
premiums in the second period as the level of policyholders’ overconfidence increases
from  ˆ to   from simulations. Increasing   can lead to a lower/higher threshold p⇤2s
as shown in Figure 2.2/Figure 2.3.
When there is no settlement market, the set of optimal period 2 contracts is
o↵ered in the form of flat premiums, which depend only on p⇤2. Therefore the only
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium Period-2 Premium Profiles with the Settlement Market: Case
II.
way to o↵er a better set of period 2 contracts is to decrease p⇤2. When the secondary
life settlement market is introduced, insurance firms provide contracts with premium
discounts rather than flat premiums, whose shape depends on not only p⇤2s but also
u(·) and v(·) (see equation (2.22)). Unlike the situation where the settlement market
is not present, without further assumptions on the utility functions, it is possible
for the insurance firms to o↵er period 2 contracts without increasing the degree of
reclassification risk as   increases. Specifically, as shown by Figure 2.3, insurance
firms can provide a set of period 2 contracts of a higher expected actuarial value
and a higher p⇤2s by lowering the premiums for some health states and increasing the
premiums for the other.
Given the set of equilibrium contracts h(Q1s, F1s), (Q2s(p2), F2s(p2)) : p2 2 [0, 1]i,
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the consumer welfare, denoted by Ws(q, ), can be derived as:
Ws(q, ) := [u(y   g  Q1s) + p1v(F1s)]
+ (1  p1)
Z 1
0
8>>><>>>:(1  q)
"
u(y + g  Q2s(p2)))
+p2v(F2s(p2))
#
+ qu(y + g +  V2s(p2))
9>>>=>>>; d (p2).
Again, q rather than q˜ is used in the calculation of consumer welfare.
Proposition 13 (Welfare implication of overconfidence) Fixing q 2 (0, 1),Ws(q, )
is weakly decreasing in  .
Proposition 13 establishes a similar comparative statics of consumer welfare with
respect to the level of policyholders’ overconfidence. The intuition is similar to Propo-
sition 10. In general, overconfidence reduces consumer welfare regardless of the pres-
ence of the settlement market.
2.4 Welfare Comparison
Lemma 15 (Fang and Kung 2010) W (q, )   Ws(q, ) if   = 0.
When the policyholder has correct belief about the probability of losing his be-
quest motive, introducing the life settlement market weakly reduces consumer welfare
in equilibrium. The proof replicates Proposition 7 in Fang and Kung (2010) and is
omitted. Because policyholders lack commitment power of not lapsing the long-term
contract in period 2, we deviate from complete markets and are in a second-best
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world. As argued in Fang and Kung (2010), although the settlement market allows
policyholders to access the actuarial value of their contracts and thus contribute to
market completeness, it also contributes market incompleteness by weakening poli-
cyholders’ ability to commit to not asking for a return when they lose their bequest
motives. Therefore introducing the settlement market can lead to a decrease in con-
sumer welfare. The next proposition provides su cient conditions under which the
welfare result in Lemma 15 can be overturned.
For ease of our exposition, let ⌘(c) =   v0(c)cv00(c) denote the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (IES) of v(·) at c by ⌘(c).
Proposition 14 Suppose ⌘(c)   ↵ > 1 for all c > 0. There exists a threshold q such
that for q   q, Ws(q, ) > W (q, ) if   is su ciently large.
The intuition can be better explained by assuming utility v(·) with constant IES
⇢, i.e., v(c) = c
1  1⇢ 1
1  1⇢
. From Lemma 10, when q and   are su ciently large, Q2(p2) =
0 for all p2; together with first order conditions (2.5b) and (2.5d), we must have
v0(F2(p2))
v0(F1) =
1 q
1 q˜ for all p2. This in turn implies that:
F2(p2)
F1
=
✓
1  q˜
1  q
◆⇢
=
✓
1 +
q
1  q 
◆⇢
. (2.24)
From (2.24) we know that the IES measures policyholders’ propensity to smooth
consumption for their dependents. Specifically, when ⇢ > 1, the equilibrium con-
sumption growth is sensitive to changes in the level of policyholders’ overconfidence
 . This indicates that policyholders’ consumption smoothing motive is weak rela-
tive to that under ⇢ < 1. In the absence of the settlement market, policyholders
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obtain a contract with a very low face value and a high premium in the first period
in exchange for the set of period 2 contracts of high actuarial values as they become
su ciently overconfident. This indeed harms policyholders especially when q and  
are su ciently large. In equilibrium, a large portion (i.e. q ) of the expected utility
promised by the set of the equilibrium contracts in the second period is not realized
due to policyholders’ misperception of the probability of losing bequest motives. To
summarize, policyholders with a high value of IES are more vulnerable from their
overconfidence and can potentially benefit more from the presence of the settlement
market than those with a low value of IES.
In the presence of the settlement market, the set of equilibrium contracts do not
deviate too much from the socially optimal contracts in terms of the degree of front-
loading as policyholders become more overconfident. In fact, we can establish a lower
bound of the expected utility for policyholders in the first period. To see this, note
that p⇤2s   p1 from Lemma 13. Therefore contracts with zero premiums in period 2
can not be sustained in equilibrium and the degree of reclassification risk insurance is
limited by the threat of life settlement market. From the zero-profit condition (2.16),
this in turn implies that there is an upper bound of the amount of front-loading. Thus
the presence of the settlement market protects policyholders from obtaining contracts
with too much front-loading in the first period as they become more overconfident.
Such protection is more valuable to the vulnerable policyholders with high IES than
those with a low value of IES and leads the consumer welfare with settlement market
to be greater than that without.
Another way to understand the welfare result is the following. As argued by Fang
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and Kung (2010), when policyholders are fully rational, introducing life settlement
market further contributes to market incompleteness and reduces consumer welfare.
When policyholders are overconfident, the settlement market has a new role: it helps
policyholders correct their biased beliefs in the second period. In particular, a fraction
q  of policyholders no long remain bequest motives in the second period as expected
at the time of purchasing insurance policies. When there is no settlement market, they
can only lapse the contract and su↵er the utility loss caused by their misperception.
However, with the settlement market, policyholders can cash out part of the actuarial
value of their contracts and undercut the utility loss. This generates a potential
welfare gain. If the magnitude of this welfare gain is large enough to o↵set the
welfare loss due to the lower degree of market completeness, introducing a secondary
settlement market can potentially benefit consumers in equilibrium.
2.5 Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, we provide su cient conditions under which consumer surplus can be
higher in the presence of the life settlement market than in its absence. Specifically,
we prove that introducing life settlement market can lead to an increase in consumer
welfare when policyholders su ciently underestimate the probability of losing their
bequest motives. There are several directions for future research. First, it would be
interesting to empirically test the existence of policyholders’ overconfidence based on
the predictions in this paper. It would also be interesting study the welfare e↵ect of
the settlement market when consumers are overconfident about their health status in
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the second period. Another intriguing research avenue would be to analyze the welfare
implications of the secondary market in a unified framework when lapsation is driven
by negative income shocks in addition to policyholders’ lost of bequest motives.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Appendix: Proofs of the propositions
Proof of Lemma 1. The first best outcome is the solution to the following
maximization problem:
max
{sˆ,q}
1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
q +
1
4
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤
q   1
2
q2.
The first order condition with respect to sˆ yields:
f1(sˆ) = f0(sˆ)) sˆFB = 1
2
.
The first order condition with respect to q yields:
qFB =
1
2
+
1
4
⇥
F0(sˆ
FB)  F1(sˆFB)
⇤
.
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Proof of Proposition 1. It is useful to first prove the two lemmas.
Lemma A1 (Uniform convergence of F1(·) as ↵!1) For any given ✏ > 0,
there exists N such that for ↵ > N , F1(s;↵) < ✏ for s 2 [0, 12 ] and F1(s;↵) <
(2s  1) + ✏ for s 2 [12 , 1].
Proof. By the definition of the completely informative information structure, given
✏0 = 12✏ and   2 (0, 12), there exists N such that f1( ;↵) < ✏0 for ↵ > N . Thus,
F1
⇣1
2
;↵
⌘
=
Z 1
2
0
f1(t;↵)dt =
Z  
0
f1(t;↵)dt+
Z 1
2
 
f1(t;↵)dt   ✏0 +
⇣1
2
  
⌘
.
Let   = 12   ✏0. F1
⇣
1
2 ;↵
⌘
can be bounded above by
F1(s;↵)  F1
⇣1
2
;↵
⌘
 ✏0
⇣1
2
  ✏0
⌘
+ ✏0 < 2✏0 = ✏ for s 2 [0, 1
2
].
Similarly, for all s 2 [12 , 1],
F1(s;↵) = 2s  F0(s;↵) = (2s  1) + F1(1  s;↵) < (2s  1) + ✏ for ↵ > N.
Lemma A2 (Uniform convergence of F1(·) as ↵! 0) For any given ✏ > 0, there
exists N such that for ↵ < N , F1(s;↵) > s  ✏ for all s 2 [0, 1].
Proof. By the definition of the completely uninformative information structure, for
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any given ✏ and   2 (0, 12), there exists N such that f1( ;↵) > 1  ✏. Thus,
s  F1(s;↵) =
Z s
0
⇥
1  f1(t;↵)
⇤
dt 
Z 1
2
0
⇥
1  f1(t;↵)
⇤
dt
=
Z  
0
⇥
1  f1(t;↵)
⇤
dt+
Z 1
2
 
⇥
1  f1(t;↵)
⇤
dt
  + ✏(1
2
  ) for s 2 [0, 1
2
].
Let   = 12✏. s  F1(s;↵) can be bounded above by
s  F1(s;↵)   + ✏(1
2
  ) < 1
2
✏+
1
2
✏ = ✏ for s 2 [0, 1
2
].
Similarly, for all s 2 [12 , 1],
s  F1(s;↵) = s 
⇥
2s  F0(s;↵)
⇤
= (1  s)  F1(1  s;↵) < ✏.
Recall that the expected profit function is
⇡(sˆ) =
1
8
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤⇢1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+
1
2
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤ f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
 
.
By Assumption 3, f0(s) = f1(1  s) and F0(s) = 1  F1(1  s). The expected profit
function can be written as
⇡(sˆ) =
1
16
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤ h⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+ sˆf1(sˆ)
i
.
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1. Anti-entrenchment:
⇡(sˆ;↵) <
1
16
(1 + sˆ) <
3
32
for all sˆ 2 [0, 1
2
].
By Lemma A1, for any ✏, there exists N such that for ↵ > N , 1   F1(sˆ;↵) >
2  2sˆ  ✏ for sˆ 2 (12 , 1). Moreover, given sˆ 2 (12 , 1) and ✏0, there exists N 0 such
that 12f1(sˆ) =
f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ)+f0(sˆ)
> 1  ✏0 for ↵ > N 0.
Let ↵ = max{N,N 0}. Then for ↵ > ↵,
⇡(sˆ;↵) >
1
16
 
2  2sˆ  ✏  ⇥(2  2sˆ  ✏) + 2sˆ(1  ✏0)⇤ .
Let sˆ = 12(1 + ✏) and ✏
0 = ✏1+✏ . Then,
⇡
⇣1
2
(1 + ✏);↵
⌘
>
1
16
(1  2✏) ⇥(1  2✏) + (1 + ✏)(1  ✏0)⇤
=
1
8
(1  2✏)(1  ✏).
To prove the proposition, it su ces to find ✏ such that
1
8
(1  2✏)(1  ✏)   3
32
.
This inequality holds when ✏  3 
p
7
4 .
2. Entrenchment:
It su ces to prove that there exists ↵ such that for ↵ < ↵ and, ⇡(sˆ) < ⇡(0) = 116
for all sˆ 2 [12 , 1]. Since f1(s) < 2 for s 2 [0, 1) by normalization, it directly
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follows that 1  F1(s) < 2(1  s). Thus, 1  F1(1  ) < 2  for   2 (0, 12).
) ⇡(sˆ) < 1
4
 ( + 1) for sˆ 2 [1  , 1].
For   to be su ciently small, 14 (  + 1) <
1
16 . In particular, let   =
p
2 1
2 .
Then sˆ 2 [1  , 1] cannot be optimal replacement policy.
It remains to prove that there extists ↵ such that for ↵ < ↵, ⇡(sˆ) < ⇡(0) for all
sˆ 2 [12 , 1    ]. By the definition of the completely uninformative information
structure, for any ✏0, there exists N 0 such that 12f1(sˆ) =
f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ)+f0(sˆ)
< 12 + ✏
0 for
sˆ 2 [12 , 1  ] and ↵ < N 0.
By Lemma A2, for any ✏, there exists N such that for ↵ < N , F1(sˆ;↵) > sˆ  ✏
for sˆ 2 [0, 1]. Thus,
⇡(sˆ) <
1
16
(1  sˆ+ ✏)⇥(1  sˆ+ ✏) + (1 + 2✏0)⇤.
Let ✏0 = ✏ =
p
3
3   12 and ↵ = min{N,N 0}. Then for ↵ < ↵,
⇡(sˆ) <
1
16
(1  sˆ+ ✏)(2  sˆ+ 3✏)  3
16
 1
2
+ ✏
 2
=
1
16
for all sˆ 2 [1
2
, 1].
Proof of Lemma 3. For existence, it su ces to construct an example. Suppose
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 
f1(·), f0(·)
 
induces g(·). By the definition of the information structure,
1
2
F1(s) +
1
2
F0(s) = s for all s 2 [0, 1], 1
2
f1(s) +
1
2
f0(s) = 1 for all s 2 [0, 1].
Meanwhile, we have
g(p) =
h1
2
f1('
 1(p)) +
1
2
f0('
 1(p)))
id' 1(p)
dp
.
Thus, g(p)dp = d' 1(p) ) '(G(p)) = p ) f˜1(x) = 2G 1(x) and f˜0(x) = 2[1  
G 1(x)]. This finishes the proof of existence.
For uniqueness, suppose two information structures {f1(s), f0(s)} and {f †1(s), f †1(s)}
induce the same g(p). By the definition of the information structure,
1
2
f †1(s) +
1
2
f †0(s) = 1 =
1
2
f1(s) +
1
2
f0(s).
By the definition of p,
1
2
f1(s) +
1
2
f0(s) =
f1(s)
2p
=
f0(s)
2(1  p) .
By the derivation of g(p),
g(p) =

1
2
f1('
 1(p)) +
1
2
f0('
 1(p))
 
d' 1(p)
dp
.
) pg(p) = 1
2
f1('
 1(p))
d' 1(p)
dp
.
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)
Z p
0
tg(t)dt =
1
2
F1('
 1(p)) =
1
2
F †1 ('
† 1(p)).
Similarly,
(1  p)g(p) = 1
2
f0('
 1(p))
d' 1(p)
dp
.
)
Z p
0
(1  t)g(t)dt = 1
2
F0('
 1(p)) =
1
2
F †0 ('
† 1(p)).
Thus,
1
2
F †1 ('
† 1(p)) +
1
2
F †0 ('
† 1(p)) =
1
2
F1('
 1(p)) +
1
2
F0('
 1(p)).
) '† 1(p) = ' 1(p)) f †1(s) = f1(s).
Since 12f
†
1(s) +
1
2f
†
0(s) =
1
2f1(s) +
1
2f0(s), it follows directly that f
†
0(s) = f0(s). This
finishes the proof of uniqueness.
Proof of Lemma 4. By definition, ⇢  1   G(p)g0(p)g2(p)  ⇢. Integrating both sides
from 0 to p yields
⇢p  G(p)
g(p)
  G(0)
g(0)
 ⇢p.
) 1
⇢
1
p
 g(p)
G(p)
 1
⇢
1
p
, 1
⇢
 pg(p)
G(p)
 1
⇢
.
Integrating both sides from p to 12 yields
1
2
(2p)
1
⇢  G(p)  1
2
(2p)
1
⇢ .
Proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma A3 If G(p)  p for all p 2 [0, 12 ], entrenchment is optimal to the board.
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Moreover, if G(p) is convex in p for p 2 [0, 12 ], pˆ⇤ = 0.
Proof. We finish the proof in two steps:
1. ⇡˜(1  pˆ) < ⇡˜(0) for pˆ 2 [0, 12 ].
It is equivalent to prove that
Z 1
1 pˆ
tg(t)dt
✓
1 
Z 1
1 pˆ
G(t)dt
◆
<
Z 1
0
tg(t)dt
✓
1 
Z 1
0
G(t)dt
◆
.
Because G(1  pˆ) = 1 G(pˆ), R 10 G(t)dt = 12 . Thus, the right-hand side can be
further simplified as
Z 1
0
tg(t)dt
✓
1 
Z 1
0
G(t)dt
◆
=
✓
1 
Z 1
0
G(t)dt
◆2
=
1
4
.
For the left-hand side,
Z 1
1 pˆ
tg(t)dt
✓
1 
Z 1
1 pˆ
G(t)dt
◆
=
✓
1 
Z 1
1 pˆ
G(t)dt  (1  pˆ)G(1  pˆ)
◆✓
1 
Z 1
1 pˆ
G(t)dt
◆
<
✓
1 
Z pˆ
0
(1 G(t))dt  1
2
(1  pˆ)[1 G(pˆ)]
◆2
=
✓
1  pˆ
2
(1 +G(pˆ)) +
Z pˆ
0
G(t)dt
◆2

✓
1  pˆ
2
(1 + pˆ) +
Z pˆ
0
tdt
◆2
=
1
4
.
2. ⇡˜(pˆ) is strictly decreasing in pˆ for pˆ 2 [0, 12 ] if G(p) is convex in p for p 2 [0, 12 ].
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First, notice that
Z 1
pˆ
tg(t)dt =
Z 1
pˆ
tdG(t) = 1 
Z 1
pˆ
G(t)dt pˆG(pˆ) < 1 
Z 1
pˆ
G(t)dt for pˆ 2 (0, 1
2
].
Second, when g(pˆ) is increasing in pˆ, we have
G(pˆ) =
Z pˆ
0
g(t)dt 
Z pˆ
0
g(t)dt = pˆg(pˆ).
Thus, ⇡˜0(p) < 0 for p 2 (0, 12 ].
It directly follows that pˆ⇤ = 0 for ↵  ↵1 by Lemma A3. For ↵ > ↵1, it is useful
to first prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma A4 If ⇢(p;↵) is weakly decreasing in p, G(p)pg(pˆ) is weakly decreasing in p for
p 2 [0, 12 ].
Proof. By the definition of ⇢-concavity,
⇢(t) = 1  G(t)g
0(t)
g2(t)
.
Integrating both sides from 0 to p yields,
Z p
0
⇢(t)dt =
G(p)
g(p)
) G(p)
pg(p)
=
R p
0 ⇢(t)dt
p
.
)
✓R p
0 ⇢(t)dt
p
◆0
=
⇢(p)p  R p0 ⇢(t)dt
p2
=
R p
0
⇥
⇢(p)  ⇢(t)⇤dt
p2
 0.
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Lemma A5 For ↵1 > ↵2, G(p;↵1) > G(p;↵2) for p 2 (0, 12).
Proof. By Lemma A4,
Z p
0
⇢(t)dt =
G(p)
g(p)
) ln  1
2
   lnG(p;↵) = Z 12
p
1R !
0 ⇢(t;↵)dt
d!.
It can be verified that
R 1
2
p
1R !
0 ⇢(t;↵)dt
d! is decreasing in ↵ by the definition of ⇢-concave
order. Thus, G(p;↵) is increasing in ↵.
Rearranging the first order condition with respect to pˆ yields
⇡˜0(pˆ) ? 0, G(pˆ)
pˆg(pˆ)
?
1  R 1pˆ G(t)dtR 1
pˆ tg(t)dt
=
1
2 +
R pˆ
0 G(t)dt
1
2 +
R pˆ
0 G(t)dt  pG(p)
.
By Lemma A4, the left-hand side is decreasing in pˆ. It is can be verified that the
right-hand side is increasing in pˆ. Thus, the board’s profit function for pˆ 2 [0, 12 ] is
well-behaved.
Notice that limp!0
G(pˆ)
pˆg(pˆ) = ⇢(0) > 1 for ↵ > ↵1, and limp!0
1 R 1pˆ G(t)dtR 1
pˆ tg(t)dt
= 1. It
su ces to compare the end points of the two curves.
If 2
R 1
2
0 ⇢(t;↵)dt >
1
2+
R 1
2
0ˆ
G(t)dt
1
4+
R 1
2
0ˆ
G(t)dt
, ⇡˜(pˆ) is increasing in pˆ 2 [0, 12 ] and the optimal cuto↵
pˆ⇤ lies between 12 and 1.
If 2
R 1
2
0 ⇢(t;↵)dt <
1
2+
R 1
2
0ˆ
G(t)dt
1
4+
R 1
2
0ˆ
G(t)dt
, ⇡˜(pˆ) is first increasing and then decreasing in pˆ 2
[0, 12 ]. The maximal can be pinned down by the first order condition for pˆ 2 [0, 12 ].
We further argue that this local maximal is indeed the global maximal for pˆ 2 [0, 1].
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To see this, notice that second order derivative of the profit function with respect to
pˆ is
⇡˜00(pˆ) =
1
4

  pˆg0(pˆ)
⇣
1 
Z 1
ˆˆp
G(t)dt
⌘
  3pˆg(pˆ)G(pˆ)
 
.
Because G(p) is concave for p 2 [0, 12 ] for ↵ > ↵1, G(p) is convex for p 2 [12 , 1]. This
directly implies g0(p) > 0 for p 2 [12 , 1]. Thus ⇡00(pˆ) < 0 for p 2 [12 , 1]. Because
⇡˜0(12) < 0, profit is decreasing in pˆ for pˆ 2 [12 , 1].
By the definition of ⇢-concavity, 2
R 1
2
0 ⇢(t;↵)dt is increasing in ↵. By Lemma A5,R 1
2
0 G(t;↵)dt is increasing in ↵)
1
2+
R 1
2
0 G(t)dt
1
4+
R 1
2
0 G(t)dt
is decreasing in ↵. By Assumptions 5(d)
and 5(e),
lim
↵!↵1
2
Z 1
2
0
⇢(t;↵)dt = 1 and lim
↵!1
2
Z 1
2
0
⇢(t;↵)dt =1.
Thus, there exists ↵2 > ↵1 such that for ↵ > ↵2, anti-entrenchment is optimal; for
↵ < ↵2, entrenchment is optimal.
Proof of Example 1. Given the functional form of g(·), it can be verified that the
board’s profit function is
⇡˜(pˆ;↵) =
8>>><>>>:
1
4
h
1
2 +
1
4
↵
↵+1(2pˆ)
↵+1
↵
i h
1
2   14 11+↵(2pˆ)
↵+1
↵
i
for pˆ 2 [0, 12 ]
1
16 [2(1  pˆ)]
↵+1
↵
h
↵
↵+1 +
pˆ
1 pˆ
i h
pˆ+ 14
↵
↵+1 [2(1  pˆ)]
↵+1
↵
i
for pˆ 2 (12 , 1]
.
It is obvious that ↵1 = 1. By the proof of Proposition 2, ↵2 is the informativeness
such that the first derivative of profit at pˆ = 12 is equal to 0. ) ↵2 =
p
5+1
2 .
Proof of Proposition 3. Designing a contract based on the signal is equivalent
to designing a contract based on the posterior belief about the incumbent’s ability
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p 2 [0, 1]. By abuse of notation, denote  w(p), r(p), k(p) as the contract based on
the board’s posterior belief. It su ces to prove that r⇤(p) = 1 for p 2 [12 , 1] and
r⇤(p) = 0 for p 2 [0, 12) in the optimal contract.
Given contract
 
w(p), r(p), k(p)
 
, the incumbent manager chooses q to maximize:
Z 1
0
 
r(p)qpw(p) + [1  r(p)]k(p) g(p)dp  C(q).
The first order condition with respect to q yields
C 0(q) =
Z 1
0
r(p)qw(p)g(p)dp.
Note that k(p) cannot provide incentive on the e↵ort level. Because the incumbent
manager is protected by limited liability, k⇤(p) = 0 in the optimal contract.
The board chooses
 
w(p), r(p)
 
to maximize
Z 1
0
n⇥
r(p)qp(1  w(p))⇤+ 1
2
q(1  r(p))
o
g(p)dp
= q
✓Z 1
0
h
r(p)p+
1
2
(1  r(p))
i
g(p)dp 
Z 1
0
r(p)pw(p)g(p)dp
◆
.
Given e↵ort level q,
R 1
0 r(p)pw(p)g(p)dp = C
0(q) is a constant by the incumbent
manager’s first order condition. It is equivalent to maximize:
Z 1
0
h
r(p)p+
1
2
(1  r(p))
i
g(p)dp.
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The integral is maximized by setting r(p) = 1 for p 2 [12 , 1] and r(p) = 0 for p 2 [0, 12).
Proof of Proposition 4. We first proved that k⇤ = 0 in the optimal contract.
Given (w1, w2, k) and belief of cuto↵ sˆ, the incumbent manager chooses q to maximize
1
2
[1  F1(sˆ)]qw1 + 1
2
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤⇣1
2
qw2 + k
⌘
  C(q).
) q = 1
2
[1  F1(sˆ)]w1 + 1
4
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤
w2.
Given (w1, w2, k) and belief of project quality q, the board’s indi↵erence condition
yields:
1
2
q(1  w2)  k = f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
q(1  w1).
The board chooses (w1, w2, k) to maximize expected profit:
1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
q(1  w1) + 1
2
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤h1
2
q(1  w2)  k
i
= q(1  w1)
⇢
1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+
1
2
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤ f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
 
.
Given (q, sˆ) the board would like to induce, it is obvious that profit is decreasing in
w1. By the two equilibrium conditions, it is easy to verify that w1(k) is increasing in
k and w2(k) is decreasing in k. Thus, k⇤ = 0.
The board’s profit maximization problem can be written as
max
{w1,w2,q,sˆ}
⇡(w1, w2, q, sˆ) :=
1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
q(1  w1) + 1
4
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤
q(1  w2)
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s.t.
q  
⇣1
2
[1  F1(sˆ)]w1 + 1
4
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤
w2
⌘
= 0
and
1
2
(1  w2)  '(sˆ)(1  w1) = 0.
Let L be the Lagrangian and denote  1 and  2 as Lagrangian multipliers on the two
constraints respectively.
@L(w1, w2, q, sˆ, 1, 2)
@w1
= 0)  1
2
 
q +  1
 ⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+ '(sˆ) 2 = 0.
@L(w1, w2, q, sˆ, 1, 2)
@w2
= 0)  1
2
(q +  1)
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤   2 = 0.
It can be verified that sˆ = 0 is never optimal. Thus, '(xˆ) > 0. Then  2 = 0 and
 1 =  q must be true. The first order condition of the Lagrangian with respect to sˆ
yields
@L(w1, w2, q, sˆ, 1, 2)
@sˆ
= 0.
)  q(1  w1)f1(sˆ) + 1
2
⇥
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
⇤
q(1  w2)
+  1
✓
f1(sˆ)w1   1
2
⇥
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
⇤
w2
◆
= 0
) '(sˆ) = 1
2
) sˆ⇤ = 1
2
.
Because 12(1  w2)  '(sˆ)(1  w1) = 0, it follows directly that w⇤1 = w⇤2.
Proof of Proposition 5. Given contract (w, k) and sˆ, the incumbent manager’s
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best response is
q =
⇢
(1 + ⌧)
h1
2
 1
2
+  
 ⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+
1
2
 1
2
    ⇥1  F0(sˆ)⇤iw  11 ⌧ .
Similarly, the board’s indi↵erence condition is
1
2
q1+⌧   k =

1
2
+
f1(sˆ)  f0(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
 
 
q1+⌧ (1  w).
Plugging the two equilibrium conditions into the board’s profit function yields
⇡(sˆ) = M
h 1
2
+  
 ⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+
 1
2
    ⇥1  F0(sˆ)⇤i 1+⌧1 ⌧
·
⇢h 1
2
+  
 ⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+
 1
2
    ⇥1  F0(sˆ)⇤i+ ⇥F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)⇤h1
2
+
f1(sˆ)  f0(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
 
i 
,
where M = 14
2
1 ⌧ (1  ⌧)(1 + ⌧) 2+2⌧1 ⌧ .
Next, we calculate the board’s expected profit for a given cuto↵ sˆ as ↵!1:
lim
↵!1
⇡(sˆ;↵) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
M
h
1  (1  2 )sˆ
i 1+⌧
1 ⌧
for sˆ 2 [0, 12)
M
h
  + 12
i 1+⌧
1 ⌧
(1 +  ) for sˆ = 12
M
h
(1 + 2 )(1  sˆ)
i 1+⌧
1 ⌧
(1 + 2 ) for sˆ 2 (12 , 1]
.
1. Entrenchment as ↵!1:
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Notice that f1(sˆ) f0(sˆ)f1(sˆ)+f0(sˆ)  1. Then ⇡(sˆ;↵) can be bounded above by
⇡(sˆ;↵) M
h 1
2
+  
 ⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+
 1
2
    ⇥1  F0(sˆ)⇤i 1+⌧1 ⌧
·
⇢h 1
2
+  
 ⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+
 1
2
    ⇥1  F0(sˆ)⇤i+ ⇥F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)⇤h1
2
+  
i 
.
Denote the right-hand side as ⇡E(sˆ;↵). By Lemma A1, F1(sˆ;↵) converges
uniformly to max
 
0, 2sˆ  1 as ↵!1. Thus, ⇡E(sˆ;↵) converges uniformly to
M
h
(1 + 2 )(1  sˆ)
i 1+⌧
1 ⌧
(1 + 2 ) for sˆ 2 [12 , 1] as ↵ !1. Because ⇡(0;↵) = M ,
entrenchment is optimal for su ciently large ↵ if
M > max
sˆ2[ 12 ,1]
n
M
⇥
(1 + 2 )(1  sˆ)⇤ 1+⌧1 ⌧  1 + 2  o)   < 1
2
1 ⌧
2   1
2
.
2. Anti-entrenchment as ↵!1:
Notice that f1(sˆ) f0(sˆ)f1(sˆ)+f0(sˆ)  0 for sˆ 2 [0, 12 ]. Then ⇡(sˆ;↵) can be bounded above by
⇡(sˆ;↵) M
h 1
2
+  
 ⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+
 1
2
    ⇥1  F0(sˆ)⇤i 1+⌧1 ⌧
·
⇢h 1
2
+  
 ⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
+
 1
2
    ⇥1  F0(sˆ)⇤i+ 1
2
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤ 
.
Denote the right-hand side as ⇡A(sˆ;↵). By Lemma A1, F1(sˆ;↵) converges
uniformly to max
 
0, 2sˆ 1 . Thus, ⇡A(sˆ;↵) converges uniformly to ⇠(sˆ;  , ⌧) =
M
h
1  (1  2 )sˆ
i 1+⌧
1 ⌧  
1 + 2 sˆ
 
for sˆ 2 [0, 12 ] as ↵!1.
Given ( , ⌧) 2 (0, 12)⇥( 1, 1), it can be verified that there exists ⌫( , ⌧) < 12 such
that ⇠(sˆ;  , ⌧) < M
⇥
  + 12
⇤ 1+⌧
1 ⌧ (1 + 2 ) for sˆ 2 [⌫( , ⌧), 12 ]. Thus, sˆ 2 [⌫( , ⌧), 12 ]
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can never be optimal for su ciently large ↵.
Because f1(sˆ) is strictly increasing in sˆ and lim↵!1 f1(sˆ;↵) = 0 for all sˆ 2 [0, 12),
f1(sˆ;↵) converges uniformly to 0 for sˆ 2 [0, ⌫( , ⌧)] as ↵ ! 1. Then ⇡(sˆ;↵)
converges uniformly toM
h
1 (1 2 )sˆ
i 1+⌧
1 ⌧
for sˆ 2 [0, ⌫( , ⌧)] as ↵!1. Thus,
entrenchment is optimal for su ciently large ↵ if
max
sˆ2[0,⌫( ,⌧)]
M
h
1  (1  2 )sˆ
i 1+⌧
1 ⌧
< M
h
  +
1
2
i 1+⌧
1 ⌧
(1 + 2 ))   > 1
2
1 ⌧
2   1
2
.
Proof of Proposition 6. Given sˆ, a contract can always be constructed to induce
sˆ. However, it is not necessarily w = 12 . k   0 does not hold for all sˆ 2 [0, 1] when
w = 12 . To see this, notice that the severance pay k is
k(sˆ, w) = ⇡
 
q(sˆ, w)
   f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
⇥
(1   )q(sˆ, w) +  e(sˆ, w)⇤(1  w).
Given sˆ, letting w be su ciently close to 1 generates a positive severance pay k.
Define Sˆ =
n
sˆ
  k(sˆ, 12)   0 & sˆ 2 [0, 1]o, which is the the set of cuto↵s that can be
induced by contracts that satisfy w = 12 and k   0. If sˆ 2 Sˆ, the board’s expected
profit can be written as
⇡(sˆ) =
1
16
h
1  F1(sˆ)
ih
(1   )2 +  2 1
1  sˆ
ih
[1  F1(sˆ)] + sˆf1(sˆ)
i
.
If sˆ /2 Sˆ, w = 12 cannot be sustained. Define W(sˆ) =
n
w
  k(sˆ, w)   0 & w 2 [0, 1]o,
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which is the set of wages that can induce sˆ without violating the limited liability
constraint of k.
1. Entrenchment:
It su ces to prove that ⇡(sˆ;↵) < ⇡(0;↵) for all sˆ 2 [12 , 1] for su ciently small
↵. ⇡(0;↵) is independent of ↵ and can be calculated as
⇡(0;↵) =
1
16
⇥
(1   )2 +  2⇤.
Lemma A6 There exist   2 (0, 12) and N such that for ↵ < N , ⇡(sˆ;↵) <
⇡(0;↵) for all sˆ 2 [1  , 1].
Proof. By Lemma A2, for any ✏ > 0 there exists N such that for ↵ < N ,
1  F1(1  ) <  + ✏ for all   2 [0, 1]. Note that 14
⇣
1
2 +
1  
  q
⌘2   12(1   )q
for all q.
The expected profit of replacement can be bounded above by
⇡(q)  k  1
4
⇣1
2
 +
1   
 
q
⌘2
=
1
16
⇣
 +
(1   )2
 
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤
w
⌘2
 1
16
⇣
 +
(1   )2
 
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤⌘2
.
87
Thus, the board’s expected profit can be bounded for sˆ 2 [1  , 1]:
⇡(sˆ)  1
2
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤⇢1  F1(sˆ)
2
(1   )2 + 1  F1(sˆ)
[1  F1(sˆ)] + [1  F0(sˆ)] 
2
 
w(1  w)
+
1
32
⇥
F1(sˆ) + F0(sˆ)
⇤⇣
 +
(1   )2
 
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤⌘2
 1
8
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤⇢1  F1(sˆ)
2
(1   )2 + 1  F1(sˆ)
[1  F1(sˆ)] + [1  F0(sˆ)] 
2
 
+
1
16
⇣
 +
(1   )2
 
⇥
1  F1(sˆ)
⇤⌘2
<
1
8
( + ✏)
h + ✏
2
(1   )2 +  2
i
+
1
16
h
 +
(1   )2
 
( + ✏)
i2
.
Note that the last expression is increasing in  + ✏. It su ces to prove that
1
16
 2 <
1
16
⇥
(1   )2 +  2⇤.
Consequently, we can always find su ciently small   and ✏ such that
1
8
( + ✏)
h + ✏
2
(1  )2+ 2
i
+
1
16
h
 +
(1   )2
 
( + ✏)
i2
<
1
16
⇥
(1  )2+ 2⇤.
Next, notice that ⇡(sˆ) is the maximum expected profit without the limited
liability constraint of k. Thus ⇡(sˆ)  ⇡(sˆ) for all sˆ 2 [0, 1].
Given ✏, the expected profit for ↵ < N for all sˆ 2 [12 , 1   ] is bounded above
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by
⇡(sˆ)  1
16
h
1  F1(sˆ)
ih
(1   )2 +  2 1
1  sˆ
ih
[1  F1(sˆ)] + xˆf1(sˆ)
i
 1
16
(1  sˆ+ ✏)
h
(1   )2 +  2 1
1  sˆ
i⇥
(1  sˆ+ ✏) + sˆ(1 + ✏)⇤
 1
16
⇣
1 +
✏
 
⌘h1
2
(1   )2 +  2
i
(1 + 2✏).
It remains to prove that 116
h
1
2(1  )2+ 2
i
< 116
⇥
(1  )2+ 2⇤, which is obvious.
2. Anti-entrenchment:
For sˆ 2 [0, 12 ], the expected profit can be bounded above by
⇡(sˆ;↵)  1
16
h
1  F1(sˆ;↵)
ih
(1   )2 +  2 1
1  sˆ
ih
[1  F1(sˆ;↵)] + xˆf1(sˆ;↵)
i
<
3
32
h
(1   )2 + 2 2
i
.
It remains to find sˆ > 12 that yields a profit no less than
3
32 [(1   )2 + 2 2]. For
notational convenience, let  =
 
 
1  
 2
.   <
p
2 1 directly implies that  < 12 .
By the limited liability constraint of k, we have
f1(sˆ)
f1(sˆ) + f0(sˆ)
⇥
(1   )q +  e⇤(1  w)  ⇡(q).
Notice that f1(sˆ)f1(sˆ)+f0(sˆ) < 1, it su ces to satisfy
1  F1(sˆ)
4
(1  )2w  
⇢
1  F1(sˆ)
2
(1   )2 + 1  F1(sˆ)
[1  F1(sˆ)] + [1  F0(sˆ)] 
2
 
w(1 w),
89
and
1  F1(sˆ;↵)
2
w   1
2
 .
The second inequality comes from the construction that the board will not
induce e↵ort from the replacement manager. Let sˆ = 12+( ) and w =
1
2+◆( ).
Then it su ces to find (, ◆) that yields a higher expected profit given  . Note
that the first inequality is independent of ↵. By Lemma A1, 1 F1(sˆ;↵)2 can be
arbitrarily close to 1  sˆ when ↵ is su ciently large. Thus, these two conditions
can be further simplified as
1
2
⇣1
2
  
⌘
 
h⇣1
2
  
⌘
+  
i⇣1
2
  ◆
⌘
,
and
2
⇣1
2
+ ◆
⌘⇣1
2
  
⌘
   .
) ◆   max
n 1
2 
1
2   +  
,
 
1  2  
1
2
o
.
Let ◆ =
1
2 
1
2 + 
. It can be verified that  < 14 if  <
1
2  . The board’s expected
profit from the contract with the incumbent manager (w, k) that induces sˆ =
1
2 +  with wage w =
1
2 + ◆ as ↵!1 is
lim
↵!1
⇡(sˆ;↵) =
h
(1   )2 1
2
   +  2i⇣1
4
 
1
2 
1
2   +  
2⌘
.
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Note that
lim
!0
lim
↵!1
⇡(sˆ;↵) = lim
!0
⇢h
(1   )2 1
2
   +  2ih1
4
 
⇣ 1
2 
1
2   +  
⌘2i 
=
1
2
⇥
(1   )2 + 2 2⇤h1
4
 
⇣ 1
2 
1
2 +  
⌘2i
>
3
32
⇥
(1   )2 + 2 2⇤.
Thus, we can find su ciently small  such that lim↵!1 ⇡(sˆ;↵) > 332
⇥
(1   )2 +
2 2
⇤
. That is, anti-entrenchment is optimal to the board when ↵ is su ciently
large and   <
p
2  1.
Proof of Proposition 7.
1. Entrenchment:
It can be verified that ⇡(0;↵) = 116 . Similarly, ⇡(1;↵) = 0. Thus, sˆ = 1 is
never optimal. It su ces to prove that there exists N such that for ↵ < N ,
⇡(sˆ) < ⇡(0) for all sˆ 2 [12 , 1].
Lemma A7 There exist   2 (0, 12) and N such that for ↵ < N , ⇡(sˆ;↵) <
⇡(0;↵) for all sˆ 2 [1  , 1].
Proof. Since q = max
 
1
2 [1 H1(sˆ)]w   12 [H0(sˆ) H1(sˆ)]k, 0
 
, the e↵ort level
of the incumbent manager can be bounded above by
q  1
2
[1 H1(sˆ)]w.
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Thus, the expected profit can be bounded above by
⇡(sˆ, q)  1
2
q[1 H1(sˆ)](1  w) +
(
1
2
qH1(sˆ) +
✓
1  1
2
q
◆
H0(sˆ)
)✓
1
2
q   k
◆
 1
2
q[1 H1(sˆ)](1  w) + 1
2
q
(
1
2
qH1(sˆ) +
✓
1  1
2
q
◆
H0(sˆ)
)
 1
2
q
⇥
[1 H1(sˆ)] + 1
⇤  q < 1 H1(sˆ).
Let   = 132 . By Lemma A2, for ✏
0 = 132 , there exists N such that for ↵ < N ,
H1(sˆ)   sˆ  ✏0 for all sˆ 2 [0, 1]. Since sˆ   1  , we have
⇡(sˆ, q) < 1 H1(sˆ)  1  sˆ+ ✏0   + ✏0 = 1
16
= ⇡(0;↵).
Lemma A8 Given any   2 (0, 12) and q 2 [0, 1], for any ✏ > 0, there exists N 0
such that for ↵ < N 0,
1
2 qh1(sˆ)
1
2 qh1(sˆ)+(1  12 q)h0(sˆ)
 12q + ✏ for sˆ 2 [12 , 1  ].
Proof. For any ✏ > 0, let ✏0 = ✏1+✏ . By the definition of the completely
uninformative information structure, there exists N 0 such that for ↵ < N 0,
h1(1   ;↵) < 1 + ✏0.
1
2qh1(sˆ)
1
2qh1(sˆ) +
 
1  12q
 
h0(sˆ)
  1
2
q =
1
2
q
⇣
1  1
2
q
⌘ h1(sˆ)  h0(sˆ)
1
2qh1(sˆ) +
 
1  12q
 
h0(sˆ)
 1
2
h1(sˆ)  h0(sˆ)
h0(sˆ)
=
h1(sˆ)  1
2  h1(sˆ)
 h1(1   ;↵)  1
2  h1(1   ;↵) 
✏0
1  ✏0 = ✏.
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By Lemma A8, for all sˆ 2 [12 , 1  ], ⇡(sˆ, q) can be bounded above by
⇡(sˆ, q)  1
2
q[1 H1(sˆ)](1  w) +
(
1
2
qH1(sˆ) +
✓
1  1
2
q
◆
H0(sˆ)
)✓
1
2
q + ✏
◆
(1  w)
 1
2
q(1  w)
⇥
1 H1(sˆ)
⇤
+
1
2
qH1(sˆ) +
⇣
1  1
2
q
⌘
H0(sˆ)
 
+ ✏
 1
4
[1 H1(sˆ)][2 H1(sˆ)]w(1  w) + ✏
 1
16
(1  sˆ+ ✏)(2  sˆ+ ✏) + ✏ = 1
16
⇣1
2
+ ✏
⌘⇣3
2
+ ✏
⌘
+ ✏.
The last expression is strictly less than 116 for su ciently small ✏.
2. Anti-entrenchment:
For sˆ 2 [0, 12 ], ⇣(sˆ, q)  12q. Thus,
⇡(sˆ, q) =
1
2
q[1 H1(sˆ)](1  w) +
(
1
2
qH1(sˆ) +
✓
1  1
2
q
◆
H0(sˆ)
)✓
1
2
q   k
◆
 1
2
q[1 H1(sˆ)](1  w) + ⇣(sˆ, q)(1  w)H0(sˆ)
 1
2
q(1  w)⇥1 +H0(sˆ) H1(sˆ)⇤
 1
4
w(1  w)⇥1 H1(sˆ)⇤⇥1 +H0(sˆ) H1(sˆ)⇤  1
8
.
Next, we consider a fixed contract (w0, k0) = (45 , 0). It can be verified that this
contract will not yield an equilibrium with a replacement cuto↵ sˆ below 12 . To
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see this, notice that the e↵ort level under this contract is
q =
2
5
[1 H1(sˆ)].
The expected profit of replacement is,
1
2
q   k = 1
5
[1 H1(sˆ)].
The expected profit created by the manager on the margin is
1
2qh1(sˆ)
1
2qh1(sˆ) +
 
1  12q
 
h0(sˆ)
(1  w)  1
2
q(1  w) = 1
25
[1 H1(sˆ)], for sˆ 2 [0, 1
2
].
The indi↵erence condition of the board never holds for sˆ 2 [0, 12 ]. Thus, the
only possible equilibrium replacement policy under this contract is sˆ > 12 . It
remains to prove that the profit of the contract is above 18 for su ciently large
↵.
Lemma A9 For any   2 (0, 12), there exists N such that for ↵ > N , sˆ(↵) <
1
2 +  with contract (w
0, k0) = (45 , 0).
Proof. It su ces to prove that for any   2 (0, 12), there exists N such that for
↵ > N , the board’s indi↵erence condition never holds for all sˆ 2 [12 + , 1] with
contract (w0, k0) = (45 , 0).
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The board’s indi↵erence condition can be simplified as
h1(sˆ;↵)
h0(sˆ;↵)
= 1 +
4
H1(sˆ;↵)
.
Since H1(sˆ)   2sˆ  1,
1 +
4
H1(sˆ;↵)
 1 + 4
H1(
1
2 + ;↵)
 1 + 2
 
.
h1(sˆ;↵)
h0(sˆ;↵)
approaches infinity as ↵ ! 1 while 1 + 4H1(sˆ;↵) is bounded, which is a
contradiction.
For notational convenience, define ⇤(sˆ;↵) = 1   H1(sˆ). The board’s expected
profit can be written as
⇡
 
sˆ(w0, k0;↵), q(w0, k0;↵)
 
=
1
5
⇤2(sˆ;↵)
⇣7
5
  2
5
⇤(sˆ;↵)
⌘
+
1
5
⇤(sˆ;↵)
⇣
1  1
5
⇤(sˆ;↵)
⌘
(2sˆ  1)
  1
5
⇤2(sˆ;↵)
⇣7
5
  2
5
⇤(sˆ;↵)
⌘
  1
5
⇤2(sˆ;↵).
By Lemma A1, given any ✏ > 0, there exists N such that for ↵ > N , ⇤(sˆ;↵) >
2(1  sˆ)  ✏ for all sˆ 2 [12 , 1]. Thus,
⇡
 
sˆ(w0, k0;↵), q(w0, k0;↵)
    1
5
⇥
2(1  sˆ)  ✏⇤2   1
5
(1  2   ✏)2.
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Let   = ✏ = 124 . Then,
⇡
 
sˆ(w0, k0;↵), q(w0, k0;↵)
    1
5
(1  2   ✏)2 = 49
320
  1
8
.
A.2 Appendix: Normalization of information struc-
ture
In this section we first show that normalizing the signal space S to [0, 1] and assuming
1
2F1(s) +
1
2F0(s) = s are without loss of generality. Next we show that the three
assumptions imposed on
 
f1(·), f0(·)
 
can be derived from similar assumptions on
information structures without such normalization.
Suppose instead the board receives a noisy signal x 2 X about the incumbent
manager’s ability ✓i. x is drawn from distribution with cdf F˜✓i(·) and pdf f˜✓i(·) for
✓i 2 {0, 1} with support X = [x, x], where  1  x < x  1. Together with the
signal space X , the two conditional distributions  f˜1(·), f˜0(·) define an information
structure.
Given an information structure
 
f˜1(·), f˜0(·),X
 
, define a new signal x by ap-
plying the probability integral transformation to x = 12 F˜1(x) +
1
2 F˜0(x). Then the
unconditional distribution of s is uniform on [0, 1]. Let F✓(s) and f✓(s) be the corre-
sponding conditional cdf and pdf for ✓i 2 {0, 1} respectively. It can be verified that
1
2F1(s) +
1
2F0(s) = s for all s 2 [0, 1].
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Assumption 6 The monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP): f˜1(x)
f˜0(x)
is strictly in-
creasing in x 2 [x, x].
Assumption 6 directly implies Assumption 1. For binary states, the MLRP as-
sumption is without loss of generality since it can always be satisfied by relabeling
signals according to the likelihood ratio.
Lemma A10 Suppose two information structures {f˜1(·), f˜0(·),X} and {f˜ †1(·), f˜ †0(·),X †}
generate the same distribution of posterior beliefs with prior Pr(✓i = 1) =
1
2 . Then
they yield the same distribution of posterior beliefs with all prior Pr(✓i = 1) 2 (0, 1).
The proof of Lemma A10 is similar to Lemma 3 and thus is omitted. Since
entrenchment (anti-entrenchment) is defined by comparing the expected ability of the
incumbent manager with that of the replacement manager, only the posterior belief
about the incumbent manager matters. By Lemma A10, we can restrict attention to
the information structures that satisfy 12F1(s) +
1
2F0(s) = s for s 2 [0, 1] without loss
of generality.
Assumption 7 Perfectly informative at extreme signals: limx!x
f˜1(x)
f˜0(x)
= 0 and
limx!x
f˜1(x)
f˜0(x)
= +1.
Assumption 8 There exists xˇ 2 (x, x) such that f˜0(x) = f˜1(2xˇ  x).
Assumptions 7 and 8 directly imply Assumptions 2 and 3, respectively. We close
this section by introducing two indexed families of information structures that satisfy
Assumptions 6 – 8. The corresponding normalized signals after probability integral
transformation also satisfy Assumption 4.
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Example 2 (Normal Distribution) Suppose x = ✓i + ✏ for ✓i 2 {0, 1}, where
✏ ⇠ N (0,↵ 1). Then x|✓ ⇠ N (✓,↵ 1).
Example 3 (Beta Distribution) Suppose f˜1(x;↵) = (1 + ↵)x↵ and f˜0(x;↵) =
(1 + ↵)(1   x)↵ for x 2 [0, 1]. Then F˜1(x;↵) = x1+↵ and F˜0(s;↵) = 1   (1   x)1+↵.
This example is borrowed from Taylor and Yildirim (2011).
For both examples, ↵ 2 (0,1) is interpreted as the informativeness of the infor-
mation structure.
A.3 Appendix: Properties of the ⇢-concave order
By Lemma A5, the ⇢-concave order implies the rotation order first introduced by
Johnson and Myatt (2006) with Pr(✓i =
1
2). It can be verified that for a di↵erent
prior, the rotation order does not remain. Intuitively, if the information structure
becomes more informative, more densities concentrate on p = 0 and p = 1, and the
distribution becomes more disperse.
Lemma A11 (Bayesian update) Suppose G1(·) is more informative than G2(·) in
the ⇢-concave order. Then '(s|G1)   '(s|G2) for s 2 (12 , 1] and '(s|G1)  '(s|G2)
for s 2 (0, 12 ].
Proof. Since G1(0) = G2(0) = 0 and G1(
1
2) = G2(
1
2) =
1
2 and G1(p)   G2(p)
for p 2 [0, 12 ] by Lemma A5, G 11 (s)  G 12 (s) for s 2 [0, 12 ]. Thus '(s|G1) =
G 11 (s)
G 11 (s)+[1 G 11 (s)]
 G 12 (s)
G 12 (s)+[1 G 12 (s)]
= '(s, |G2). The proof for s 2 (12 , 1] is similar.
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Lemma A11 shows the implication of the ⇢-concave order on the Bayesian update
of the incumbent manager’s ability. The posterior belief '(x;↵) rotates counter-
clockwise via (12 ,
1
2) the as information structure becomes more informative. In other
words, a fixed signal x has more information value to the board as the information
structure becomes more informative.
Lemma A12 (Comparison with Blackwell’s su ciency) If G1(·) is more in-
formative than G2(·) in the ⇢-concave order, G1(·) is more informative than G2(·) in
the sense of Blackwell.
Proof.
Lemma A13 F1(s|G1)  F1(s|G2) and F0(s|G1)   F0(s|G2) for s 2 [0, 1].
Proof. From the proof of Lemma A11, G 11 (s)  G 12 (s) for s 2 [0, 12 ].
1. For s 2 [0, 12 ],
F1(s|G1) =
Z s
0
f1(t|G1)dt =
Z s
0
2G 11 (t)dt 
Z s
0
2G 12 (t)dt = F1(s|G2).
2. For s 2 (12 , 1],
F1(s|G1) =
Z s
0
f1(t|G1)dt =
Z 1 s
0
f1(t|G1)dt+
Z s
1 s
f1(t|G1)dt
=
Z 1 s
0
f1(t|G1)dt+ 1
2
(2s  1)

Z 1 s
0
f1(t|G2)dt+
Z s
1 s
f1(t|G2)dt = F1(s|G2).
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Thus, F1(s|G1)  F1(s|G2) for s 2 [0, 1]. Similarly, F0(s|G1)   F0(s|G2).
Note that for binary states, Blackwell’s order is equivalent to Lehmann’s order.
Thus, it su ces to prove that for ! 2 (0, 1),
F1(F
 1
0 (!|G1)|G1)  F1(F 10 (!|G2)|G2).
Suppose we have the contrary, then there exists !0 such that,
F1(F
 1
0 (!
0|G1)|G1) > F1(F 10 (!0|G2)|G2).
By Lemma A13, it follows directly that F 10 (!
0|G1) > F 10 (!0|G2). However, F 10 (!0|G1) >
F 10 (!
0|G2) cannot be true. To see this, let s1 = F 10 (!0|G1) and s2 = F 10 (!0|G2).
Then s1 > s2 and F0(s1|G1) = F0(s2|G1) = !0. Again by Lemma A13, we have
F0(s1|G1) > F0(s2|G1)   F0(s2|G2), which is a contradiction.
100
Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Appendix: Proofs of the propositions
Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose p2 2 B and p02 2 NB, conditions (2.6) implies that
 (p2)  0 and  (p02) = 0. Thus, Q2(p2) = p2F2(p2) > 0)  (p2) = 0. The first order
conditions (2.5c) imply that:
(1  q˜)u0(y + g  Q2(p2)) = (1  q)µ+  (p2) +  (p2)
(1  p1) (p2)
 (1  q)µ+  (p
0
2) +  (p
0
2)
(1  p1) (p02)
= (1  q˜)u0(y + g  Q2(p02)).
Since u(·) is strictly concave, it must be that Q2(p2)  Q2(p02). Similarly, it can be
proved that F2(p2)   F2(p02).
To prove p2 < p02, suppose p2   p02 instead. Then we have
Q2(p2)  Q2(p02) < p02F2(p02)  p2F2(p2),
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which is a contradiction to p2 2 B.
Proof of Lemma 8. Suppose there exist two health states pi2 6= 0 and pj2 6= 0 such
that Q2(pi2) > 0 and Q2(p
j
2) = 0, then  (p
i
2) = 0 and  (p
j
2)   0. Moreover,  (pi2)  0
and  (pj2) = 0. From the first order conditions (2.5c) we have:
(1  q˜)u0(y + g  Q2(pi2)) = (1  q)µ+
 (pi2) +  (p
i
2)
(1  p1) (pi2)
 (1  q)µ+  (p
j
2) +  (p
j
2)
(1  p1) (pj2)
= (1  q˜)u0(y + g  Q2(pj2)).
Thus, u0(y + g   Q2(pi2))  u0(y + g   Q2(pj2)). By the strict concavity of u(·),
Q2(pi2)  Q2(pj2), which is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 10.
Lemma B1 If   = 0, Q2(p2) > 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1].
Proof. Suppose there exists a health state pˆ2 2 (0, 1] such that Q2(pˆ2) = 0, then
 (pˆ2) > 0. Since F2(p2) > 0 for all p2 > 0, pˆ2F2(pˆ2)   Q2(pˆ2) > 0 )  (pˆ2) = 0.
Since   = 0, combining first order conditions (2.5a) and (2.5c) yields u0(y + g) =
u0(y + g  Q2(pˆ2))   µ = u0(y   g  Q1), which is a contradiction.
Lemma B2 Fixing q, if there exist   and  0 such that Q2(p2) > 0 and Q02(p2) = 0
for all p2 2 (0, 1], then   <  0.
Proof. Suppose      0 instead, then q˜  q˜0. Since Q02(p2) = 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1],
 0(p2)   0 and  0(p2) = 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1]. Similarly,  (p2) = 0 and  (p2)  0 for all
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p2 2 (0, 1]. From (2.5c) and (2.5d), we have:
v0(F 02(p2)) = u
0(y + g  Q02(p2)) 
 0(p2)
(1  q˜0)(1  p1) (p2)
< u0(y + g  Q2(p2)) = v0(F2(p2)) for all p2 2 (0, 1].
The last strict inequality follows from that  (p2) = 0 and Q2(p2) > Q02(p2) = 0. Thus,
F 02(p2) > F2(p2) for all p2 2 (0, 1] by the strict concavity of v(·).
Combining conditions (2.5b) and (2.5c) yields:
(1  q)v0(F1) = (1  q˜)u0(y + g  Q2(p2))   (p2) +  (p2)
(1  p1) (p2)
  (1  q˜)u0(y + g  Q2(p2))
> (1  q˜0)u0(y + g  Q02(p2))
  (1  q˜0)u0(y + g  Q02(p2)) 
 0(p2) +  0(p2)
(1  p1) (p2) = (1  q)v
0(F 01).
Therefore (1  q)v0(F 01) < (1  q)v0(F1)) F 01 > F1 andQ01 < Q1.
Hence,
0 = (Q01   p1F 01) + (1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
0
[Q02(p2)  p2F 02(p2)]d (p2)
< (Q1   p1F1) + (1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
0
[Q2(p2)  p2F2(p2)]d (p2) = 0,
which is a contradiction.
Lemma B3 Fixing q˜, there exists at least one q 2 [q˜, 1) such that Q2(pi2) = 0 for
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some pi2 6= 0.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a q˜ such that Q2(p2) > 0 for all
q 2 [q˜, 1). This implies that  (p2)  0 and  (p2) = 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1]. We must have
v0(F2(p2)) = u0(y+g Q2(p2)) > u0(y+g) for all p2 2 (0, 1]. Hence F2(p2) is bounded
from above by v0 1(u0(y + g)). The first period profit is bounded from above by,
0  Q1   p1F1 < (1  p1)(1  q)p2v0 1(u0(y + g)), (B.1)
where, p2 ⌘
R 1
0 p2d (p2) is the expected mortality rate in period 2. Taking left limit
of (B.1) yields:
0  lim
q!1 
(Q1   p1F1)  lim
q!1 
(1  p)(1  q)p2v0 1(u0(y + g)) = 0.
Thus, limq!1 (Q1   p1F1) = 0 ) limq!1  F1 = F FI1 and limq!1  Q1 = QFI1 , where
hQFI1 , F FI1 i is the solution to the following pair of equations:
u0(y   g  Q1FI) = v0(F1FI),
p1F1
FI  Q1FI = 0.
Plugging (2.5b) into (2.5d) yields:
(1  q˜)v0(F2(p2)) = (1  q)v0(F1) +  (p2)
(1  p1) (p2) .
Note that limq!1 (1  q˜)v0(F2(p2))   limq!1 (1  q˜)u0(y + g) > 0 while limq!1 (1 
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q)v0(F1) +
 (p2)
(1 p1) (p2)  0, which is a contradiction.
Lemma B4 Fixing q˜, there exists a threshold q0(q˜) < 1 such that Q2(p2)=0 for all
p2 2 (0, 1] if q > q0(q˜) and Q2(p2) > 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1] if q < q0(q˜). Moreover, q0(q˜)
is weakly increasing in q˜.
Proof. Lemma B1 states that Q2(p2) > 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1] if q = q˜. Similarly,
Lemma B3 together with Lemma B2 tells that there exists at least one q with q > q˜
such that Q2(p2) > 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1]. To prove the existence of threshold q0(q˜),
suppose to the contrary that there exist q0 and q with q0 > q such that Q2(p2) = 0 and
Q02(p2) > 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1]. Then  (p2) = 0,  0(p2)  0,  (p2)   0 and  0(p2) = 0.
From (2.5c) and (2.5d), we have:
v0(F2(p2)) = u0(y + g  Q2(p2))   (p2)
(1  q˜)(1  p1) (p2)
< u0(y + g  Q02(p2)) = v0(F 02(p2)) for all p2 2 (0, 1].
The last strict inequality follows from that  (p2)   0 and Q02(p2) > Q2(p2) = 0.
Therefore F2(p2) > F 02(p2) for all p2 2 (0, 1] by the strict concavity of v(·). Combining
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conditions (2.5b) and (2.5c) yields:
v0(F1) =
1  q˜
1  qu
0(y + g  Q2(p2))   (p2) +  (p2)
(1  p1)(1  q) (p2)
 1  q˜
1  qu
0(y + g  Q2(p2))
<
1  q˜
1  q0u
0(y + g  Q02(p2))
 1  q˜
1  q0u
0(y + g  Q02(p2)) 
 0(p2) +  0(p2)
(1  p1)(1  q0) (p2) = v
0(F 01).
Thus, F1 > F 01 and Q1 < Q
0
1. Hence,
0 = (Q01   p1F 01) + (1  p1)(1  q0)
Z 1
0
[Q02(p2)  p2F 02(p2)]d (p2)
> (Q1   p1F1) + (1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
0
[Q2(p2)  p2F2(p2)]d (p2) = 0,
which is a contradiction.
To prove that q0(q˜) is weakly increasing in q˜, suppose there exists q˜1 > q˜2 such that
q0(q˜1) < q0(q˜2). It follows directly that q˜2 < q˜1 < q0(q˜1) < q0(q˜2). Fix q =
q0(q˜1)+q0(q˜2)
2 .
Because q < q0(q˜2), all period 2 premiums except health state p2 = 0 are positive
if q˜ = q˜2. Similarly, because q > q0(q˜1), all period 2 premiums are zero if q˜ = q˜1.
However, Lemma B2 implies that q˜2 > q˜1, which is a contradiction.
Let q = q0(0). Suppose q < q. We want to show that Q2(p2) > 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1]
and   2 [0, 1]. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a q˜ such that Q2(p2) = 0
for all p2 2 (0, 1]. By Lemma B4, q   q0(q˜)   q0(0) = q, which is a contradiction.
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Suppose q > q. If q˜ = 0 (i.e.   = 1), Lemma B4 implies that Q2(p2) = 0 for
all p2 2 (0, 1]. If q˜ = q (i.e.   = 0), Lemma B1 implies that Q2(p2) > 0 for all
p2 2 (0, 1]. Thus, from Lemma B2 there exists a threshold  (q) < 1 for q > q such
that Q2(p2) = 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1] if   >  (q) and Q2(p2) > 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1] if
  <  .
Proof of Proposition 9. Suppose to the contrary that  ˆ <   (ˆ˜q > q˜) and
Qˆ1   Q1. Equation (2.7) implies that Fˆ1  F1. If health state p2 binds under  ˆ,
then Qˆ2(p2)  p2Fˆ2(p2) = 0   Q2(p2)  p2F2(p2).
If health state p2 does not bind under  ˆ, we have:
(1  q˜)v0(F2(p2)) = (1  q)v0(F1) +  (p2)
(1  p1) (p2)
 (1  q)v0(Fˆ1) = (1  ˆ˜q)v0(Fˆ2(p2)).
Because ˆ˜q > q˜, we must have (1  ˆ˜q)v0(Fˆ2(p2))   (1  q˜)v0(F2(p2)). Thus, v0(Fˆ2(p2)) >
v0(F2(p2)). By the strict concavity of v(·), Fˆ2(p2) < F2(p2) if p2 2 NB under  ˆ.
If  (p2) = 0, we have (1   ˆ˜q)u0(y + g   Qˆ2(p2))   (1   q˜)u0(y + g   Q2(p2)) )
Qˆ2(p2)   Q2(p2). If  (p2) > 0, then we have Qˆ2(p2)   Q2(p2) = 0. Either way,
Qˆ2(p2)   Q2(p2). The profit under  ˆ is:
(Qˆ1   p1Fˆ1) + (1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
0
[Qˆ2(p2)  p2Fˆ2(p2)]d (p2)
> (Q1   p1F1) + (1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
0
[Q2(p2)  p2F2(p2)]d (p2) = 0,
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where the last inequality follows from postulated p⇤2 < 1. This is a contradiction to
the zero-profit condition (2.2).
To prove that pˆ⇤2 > p
⇤
2, suppose instead pˆ
⇤
2  p⇤2. It follows immediately that
Qˆ⇤2  Q⇤2 and Fˆ ⇤2   F ⇤2 . Moreover, we have Qˆ1 < Q1 and Fˆ1 > F1. The profit under
 ˆ is bounded above by
(Qˆ1   p1Fˆ1) + (1  p1)(1  q)
(Z pˆ⇤2
0
[Qˆ2   p2Fˆ2]d (p2) +
Z 1
pˆ⇤2
[Qˆ2   p2Fˆ2]d (p2)
)
= (Qˆ1   p1Fˆ1) + (1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
pˆ⇤2
[Qˆ⇤2   p2Fˆ ⇤2 ]d (p2)
= (Qˆ1   p1Fˆ1) + (1  p1)(1  q)
(Z p⇤2
pˆ⇤2
[Qˆ⇤2   p2Fˆ ⇤2 ]d (p2) +
Z 1
p⇤2
[Qˆ⇤2   p2Fˆ ⇤2 ]d (p2)
)
< (Q1   p1F1) + (1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
p⇤2
[Q⇤2   p2F ⇤2 ]d (p2) = 0,
which again is a contradiction to the zero-profit condition (2.2).
Proof of Proposition 10. Similar to the proof of Proposition 9, we can show
that if p⇤2 = 1 for some  ˆ, p
⇤
2 = 1 for all   <  ˆ. Therefore it su ces to discuss the
following three cases.
Case I: If the period 2 equilibrium contracts for all p2 are spot contracts under some
(q, ). It is obvious that decreasing  does not change the equilibrium contracts
and consumer welfare stays constant.
Case II: Suppose p⇤2 = 0. By Lemma 10, p
⇤
2
0 = 0 for 0 >  . In this case, Q2(p2) = 0
and F2(p2) remain constant. Define F2 by F2 ⌘ F2(p2). The optimal contracts
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can be pinned down by the following system of equations:
(1  q˜)v0(F2) = (1  q)v0(F1), (B.2a)
v0(F1) = u0(y   g  Q1), (B.2b)
(Q1   p1F1)  (1  p1)(1  q)p2F2 = 0. (B.2c)
Taking derivative with respect to   for (B.2c) yields:
dQ1
d 
  p1dF1
d 
= (1  p1)(1  q)p2
dF2
d 
. (B.3)
The derivative with respect to   for W (q, ) can be simplified as:
@W (q, )
@ 
=  u0(y   g  Q1)dQ1
d 
+ p1v
0(F1)
dF1
d 
+ (1  p1)(1  q)p2v0(F2)
dF2
d 
= v0(F1)
✓
 dQ1
d 
+ p1
dF1
d 
◆
+ (1  p1)(1  q)p2v0(F2)
dF2
d 
=  (v0(F1)  v0(F2))
✓
dQ1
d 
  p1dF1
d 
◆
.
Noting that v0(F1)  v0(F2) = q q˜1 qv0(F2)   0 by (B.2a) and dQ1d  > 0 and dF1d  < 0
by Proposition 9, we must have @W (q, )@   0.
Case III: Suppose 0 < p⇤2 < 1, p
⇤
2 is strictly decreasing   by Proposition 9. Thus,
there exists a one-to-one mapping between   and p⇤2. Once p
⇤
2 is determined,
the optimal contract is pinned down. Hence, to show W (q, ) is decreasing in
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  is equivalent to show that consumer welfare is increasing in p⇤2.
Denote W p(p⇤2) by:
W p(p⇤2) =[u(y   g  Q1(p⇤2)) + p1v(F1(p⇤2))]
+ (1  p1)(1  q)
Z p⇤2
0
[u(y + g  QFI2 (p2)) + p2v(F FI2 (p2))]d (p2)
+ (1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
p⇤2
[u(y + g  QFI2 (p⇤2)) + p2v(F FI2 (p⇤2))]d (p2),
where hQ1(p⇤2), F1(p⇤2)i is the solution to the following pair of equations:
u0(y   g  Q1(p⇤2)) = v0(F1(p⇤2)), (B.4a)
Q1(p
⇤
2)  p1F1(p⇤2) = (1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
p⇤2
[p2F
FI
2 (p
⇤
2) QFI2 (p⇤2)]d (p2). (B.4b)
Taking derivative with respect to p⇤2 for (B.4b) yields:
(1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
p⇤2
 
p2
dF FI2
dp⇤2
  dQ
FI
2
dp⇤2
!
d (p2) =  
✓
p1
dF1
dp⇤2
  dQ1
dp⇤2
◆
.
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Taking derivative with respect to p⇤2 for W
p(p⇤2) yields:
dW p(p⇤2)
dp⇤2
= v0(F1)
✓
p1
dF1
dp⇤2
  dQ1
dp⇤2
◆
+ (1  p1)(1  q)[u(y + g  QFI2 (p⇤2)) + p2v(F FI2 (p⇤2))]
+ (1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
p⇤2
v0(F2)
 
p2
dF FI2
dp⇤2
  dQ
FI
2
dp⇤2
!
d (p2)
  (1  p1)(1  q)[u(y + g  QFI2 (p⇤2)) + p2v(F FI2 (p⇤2))]
= v0(F1)
✓
p1
dF1
dp⇤2
  dQ1
dp⇤2
◆
+ (1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
p⇤2
v0(F2)
 
p2
dF FI2
dp⇤2
  dQ
FI
2
dp⇤2
!
d (p2)
= [v0(F1)  v0(F2)]
✓
p1
dF1
dp⇤2
  dQ1
dp⇤2
◆
.
By Proposition 9, p⇤2 and F1 are decreasing in  , and Q1 is increasing in  .
Thus, dF1dp⇤2
  0 and dQ1dp⇤2  0. Thus,
dW p(p⇤2)
dp⇤2
  0) @W (q, )@    0.
Proof of Lemma 11. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a tuple (q, ) such
that Q2s(pi2) = 0 for some health state p
i
2 2 (0, 1]. This implies that  (pi2)   0 and
 (pi2) = 0. From (2.19a) and (2.19c), we have:
(1 q˜)u0(y+g)+ q˜u0(y+g+ V2s(pi2)) = u0(y g Q1s)+
 (pi2) +  (p
i
2)
(1  p1) (pi2)
  u0(y g Q1s),
which is a contradiction since (1   q˜)u0(y + g) +  q˜u0(y + g +  V2s(pi2))  [1   (1  
 )q˜]u0(y + g) < u0(y   g  Q1s).
Proof of Lemma 13. Suppose there exists a tuple (q, ) such that p⇤2s < p1, then
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the no-lapsation condition (2.17) of the period 2 health state p2 = p1 does not bind
(i.e.  (p1) = 0) and Q2s(p1)  p1F2s(p1) < 0.
Noting that u0(y+g Q2s(p1)) > (1 q˜)u0(y+g Q2s(p1))+ q˜u0(y+g+ V2s(p1)) =
u0(y   g  Q1s), we must have Q2s(p1) > Q1s + 2g and F2s(p1) < F1s.
Hence, 0 > Q2s(p1)   p1F2s(p1) > Q1s + 2g   p1F1s ) Q1s   p1F1s <  2g  0,
which is a contradiction to (2.16).
Proof of Proposition 12. Suppose  ˆ <   (ˆ˜q > q˜) and Fˆ1s  F1s. This implies
directly that Qˆ1s   Q1s.
If health state p2 binds under  ˆ, then Qˆ2s(p2)   p2Fˆ2s(p2) = 0   Q2s(p2)  
p2F2s(p2).
If health state p2 does not bind under  ˆ, from (2.19b) and (2.19d) we have:
(1  q˜)v0(F2s(p2)) +  q˜u0(y + g +  V2s(p2))
= v0(F1s) +
 (p2)
(1  p1) (p2)
 v0(Fˆ1s)
= (1  ˆ˜q)v0(Fˆ2s(p2)) +   ˆ˜qu0(y + g +  Vˆ2s(p2)). (B.5)
Next, we prove that Fˆ2s(p2) < F2s(p2). Suppose not, then we must have Fˆ2s(p2)  
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F2s(p2) and Qˆ2s(p2)  Q2s(p2). This implies that Vˆ2s(p2)   V2s(p2). Thus,
(1  q˜)v0(F2s(p2)) +  q˜u0(y + g +  V2s(p2))
> (1  ˆ˜q)v0(F2s(p2)) +   ˆ˜qu0(y + g +  V2s(p2))
  (1  ˆ˜q)v0(Fˆ2s(p2)) +   ˆ˜qu0(y + g +  Vˆ2s(p2)),
which is a contradiction to (B.5). Thus, when health state p2 does not bind under
 ˆ, we must have Fˆ2s(p2) < F2s(p2) and Qˆ2s(p2) > Q2s(p2) ) Qˆ2s(p2)   p2Fˆ2s(p2) >
Q2s(p2)  p2F2s(p2). Hence,
(Qˆ1s   p1Fˆ1s) + (1  p1)
Z 1
0
[Qˆ2s(p2)  p2Fˆ2s(p2)]d (p2)
> (Q1s   p1F1s) + (1  p1)
Z 1
0
[Q2s(p2)  p2F2s(p2)]d (p2) = 0,
which is a contradiction to (2.16).
Proof of Proposition 13.
Lemma B5 Fixing q 2 [0, 1), if p⇤2s < 1 under   and pˆ⇤2s = 1 under  ˆ, then   >  ˆ.
Proof. Suppose instead     ˆ (i.e. q˜   ˆ˜q). The threshold pˆ⇤2s = 1 implies
that the period 2 contracts with  ˆ are spot contracts for all p2 2 [0, 1]. Thus,
Qˆ2s(p2) = QFI2 (p2). From (2.19a) and (2.19c), we have:
(1  ˆ˜q)u0(y + g  QFI2 (p⇤2s)) +   ˆ˜qu0(y + g)  u0(y   g   Qˆ1).
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Similarly, we have:
(1  q˜)u0(y + g  Q2(p⇤2s)) +  q˜u0(y + g +  V2(p⇤2s)) = u0(y   g  Q1).
Since p⇤2s < 1 and pˆ
⇤
2s = 1, we must have Q1 > Qˆ1 from (2.16), which implies that
u0(y   g  Q1) > u0(y   g   Qˆ1). Thus,
(1 ˆ˜q)u0(y+g QFI2 (p⇤2s))+  ˆ˜qu0(y+g) < (1 q˜)u0(y+g Q2(p⇤2s))+ q˜u0(y+g+ V2(p⇤2s)),
which is a contradiction since
(1  ˆ˜q)u0(y + g  QFI2 (p⇤2s)) +   ˆ˜qu0(y + g)
  (1  q˜)u0(y + g  QFI2 (p⇤2s)) +  q˜u0(y + g)
= (1  q˜)u0(y + g  Q2(p⇤2s)) +  q˜u0(y + g +  V2(p⇤2s)),
where the inequality follows from postulated q˜   ˆ˜q and the equality follows from
Lemma 14.
By Lemma B5, it su ces to discuss two cases:
Case I: For all  , p⇤2s(q˜) = 1. Because the period 2 equilibrium contracts are spot
contracts for all p2 2 [0, 1], hQ2s(p2), F2s(p2) : p2 2 [0, 1]i are independent of  
and Ws(q, ) is constant with respect to  .
Case II: There exists a threshold   such that p⇤2s < 1 if   >   and p
⇤
2s = 1
if   <  . If   <  , the argument in Case I applies. If   >  , by implicit
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function theorem, p⇤2s( ) is continuous and di↵erentiable. Notice that  (p2)  0
if p2 2 Bs and  (p2) = 0 if p2 2 NBs. The zero-profit condition (2.16) can be
written as:
(Q1s   p1F1s) + (1  p1)
Z 1
p⇤2s
[Q2s(p2)  p2F2s(p2)]d (p2) = 0.
Taking derivative with respect to   for the above equation yields:
✓
@Q1s
@ 
  p1@F1s
@ 
◆
+(1 p1)
Z 1
p⇤2s
✓
@Q2s(p2)
@ 
  p2@F2s(p2)
@ 
◆
d (p2) = 0. (B.6)
Taking derivative with respect to   for Ws(q, ) yields:
@Ws(q, )
@ 
= v0(F1s)
✓
p1
@F1s
@ 
  @Q1s
@ 
◆
+ (1  p1)
Z 1
p⇤2s
"
(1  q)v0(F2s)
+ qu0(y + g +  V2s)
#✓
p2
@F2s
@ 
  @Q2s
@ 
◆
d (p2)
= (1  p1)
Z 1
p⇤2s
✓
@Q2s
@ 
  p2@F2s
@ 
◆" v0(F1s)  (1  q)v0(F2s)
  qu0(y + g +  V2s)
#
d (p2)
= (1  p1)(q   q˜)
Z 1
p⇤2s
✓
@Q2s
@ 
  p2@F2s
@ 
◆" u0(y + g  Q2s)
  u0(y + g +  V2s)
#
d (p2),
where the second equality follows from (B.6) and the third equation follows
from the fact that (1   q˜)v0(F2s(p2)) +  q˜u0(y + g +  V2s(p2)) = µ = v0(F1s)
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if p2 2 NB. Denote x(p2) ⌘ @Q2s(p2; )@    p2 @F2s(p2; )@  and y(p2) ⌘ u0(y + g  
Q2s(p2; ))    u0(y + g +  V2s(p2; )). Because Q2s(p2) and V2s(p2) are both
non-negative, y(p2)   (1    )u0(y + g) > 0. Divide NBs into two subsets
NB+s ⌘ {p2|p2 2 NBs, x(p2)   0} and NB s ⌘ {p2|p2 2 NBs, x(p2) < 0}
depending on the sign of x(p2). For p2 2 NBs, we must have  (p2) = 0. Notice
that q˜ = q(1  ). Combing (2.19b) and (2.19c) yields:
(1  q˜)u0(y + g  Q2s) +  q˜u0(y + g +  V2s) = v0(F1s). (B.7)
Taking derivative with respect to   for (B.7) and rearranging yields:
q
⇥
u0(y + g  Q2s)   u0(y + g +  V2s)
⇤
= v00(F1s)
@F1s
@ 
+  2q˜u00(y + g +  V2s)
✓
@Q2s
@ 
  p2@F2s
@ 
◆
+ (1  q˜)u00(y + g  Q2s)@Q2s
@ 
. (B.8)
Suppose pi 2 NB+s and pj 2 NB s , x(pi)   0 > x(pj) by definition. From (B.8)
we have y(pi) < y(pj) . Denote y ⌘ supp22NB+s y(p2) and y ⌘ infp22NB s y(p2).
It follows directly that y   y. The derivative with respect to   for Ws(q, )
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can be further simplified as:
@Ws(q, )
@ 
= (1  p1)(q   q˜)
Z 1
p⇤2s
x(p2)y(p2)d (p2)
= (1  p1)(q   q˜)
 Z
p22NB+s
x(p2)y(p2)d (p2) +
Z
p22NB s
x(p2)y(p2)d (p2)
!
 (1  p1)(q   q˜)
 Z
p22NB+s
x(p2)yd (p2) +
Z
p22NB s
x(p2)yd (p2)
!
 (1  p1)(q   q˜)y
Z 1
p⇤2s
x(p2)d (p2)
= (q   q˜)y
✓
p1
@F1s
@ 
  @Q1s
@ 
◆
,
where the last equality follows from (B.6). Proposition 12 implies that p1
@F1s
@   
@Q1s
@   0. Together with the fact that y > 0, we must have @Ws(q, )@   0.
Proof of Proposition 14.
Lemma B6 Fixing q˜, limq!1(1 p1)(1 q)
R 1
0 [u(y+g Q2(p2))+p2v(F2(p2))]d (p2) =
0.
Proof. The result is obvious if v(·) is bounded. Suppose limc!1 v(c) = 1. By
Lemma B4, Q2(p2) = 0 for all p2 2 [0, 1] if q > q0(q˜). Thus, limq!1Q2(p2) = 0 and
limq!1 u(y+ g Q2(p2)) = u(y+ g). The zero-profit condition (2.2) can be rewritten
as:
(1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
0
F2(p2)d (p2) = Q1   p1F1,
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where 0  Q1(q)  p1F1(q)  y   g. Thus,
0 
Z 1
0
p2v(F2(p2))d (p2)

Z 1
0
v(p2F2(p2))d (p2)
 v
 Z 1
0
p2F2(p2)d (p2)
!
 v
✓
y   g
(1  p1)(1  q)
◆
,
where the second and third inequalities come from the concavity of v(·). Hence,
0  lim
q!1
(1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
0
p2v(F2(p2))d (p2)
 lim
q!1
(1  p1)(1  q)v
✓
y   g
(1  p1)(1  q)
◆
= 0.
The last equality holds due to L’Hospital rule and the assumption that limc!1 v0(c) =
0. To see this,
lim
q!1
(1  p1)(1  q)v
✓
y   g
(1  p1)(1  q)
◆
= lim
x!0
v
 
y g
x
 
1
x
= (y   g) lim
x!0
v0
✓
y   g
x
◆
= 0.
Therefore limq!1(1   p1)(1   q)
R 1
0 p2v(F2(p2))d (p2) = 0 ) limq!1(1   p1)(1  
q)
R 1
0 [u(y + g  Q2(p2)) + p2v(F2(p2))]d (p2) = 0.
Lemma B7 Let W †(q, q˜) ⌘ W (q, q q˜q ). If ⌘(c)   ↵ > 1 for all c, limq!1W †(q, q˜) =
[u(0) + p1v(0)] + (1  p1)u(y + g) for all q˜ 2 [0, 1).
Proof. Fix q˜. When q > q0(q˜), Q2(p2) = 0 and  (p2) = 0 for all p2 2 (0, 1] by Lemma
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B4. Combing (2.5b) and (2.5d) yields:
(1  q˜)v0(F2(p2)) = (1  q)v0(F1). (B.9)
Notice that F2(p2)   F1 because q˜  q. Because ⌘(c) =   v0(c)cv00(c)   ↵, 1↵v0(c) +
cv00(c)   0) c 1↵ v0(c) is weakly increasing in c. Thus,
F
1
↵
2 (p2)v
0(F2(p2))   F
1
↵
1 v
0(F1). (B.10)
Equation (B.9), together with (B.10), implies that:
1  q
1  q˜ =
v0(F2(p2))
v0(F1(q))
 
✓
F1
F2(p2)
◆ 1
↵
.
Rearranging the above inequality yields:
F2(p2)   F1
✓
1  q˜
1  q
◆↵
.
From the zero-profit condition (2.2) and the inequality above, we have:
p1F1 + (1  p1)(1  q)p2F1
✓
1  q˜
1  q
◆↵
 p1F1 + (1  p1)(1  q)
Z 1
0
p2F2(p2)d (p2) = Q1  y   g,
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where p2 is defined as p2 ⌘
R 1
0 p2d (p2). Thus,
0  F1  y   g
p1 + (1  p1)(1  q)p2
⇣
1 q˜
1 q
⌘↵ .
Taking limit of the above inequality yields:
0  lim
q!1
F1(q)  lim
q!1
y   g
p1 + (1  p1)(1  q)p2
⇣
1 q˜
1 q
⌘↵ = 0.
) lim
q!1
F1 = 0 and lim
q!1
Q1 = y   g.
Thus, limq!1W †(q, q˜) = (u(0) + p1v(0)) + (1  p1)u(y + g).
Lemma B8 Let W †s (q, q˜) ⌘ Ws(q, q q˜q ). Suppose ⌘(c)   ↵ > 1 for all c. Fixing
q˜ 2 [0, 1), there exists a threshold q such that for q   q, W †s (q, q˜) > W †(q, q˜).
Proof. Fixing q˜, note that the equilibrium contract with the presence of the set-
tlement market does not depend on q. Hence, limq!1W †s (q, q˜) = [u(y   g   Q1s) +
p1v(F1s)] + (1  p1)
R 1
0 u(y + g +  V2s(p2))d (p2).
Because (F1s, Q1s) = (0, y g) is possibly the most front-loading contract in period
1, we must have u(y   g   Q1s) + p1v(F1s) > u(0) + p1v(0). Together with the fact
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that u(y + g)  u(y + g +  V2s(p2)), we must have
lim
q!1
W †(q, q˜)
= [u(0) + p1v(0)] + (1  p1)u(y + g)
< [u(y   g  Q1s) + p1v(F1s)] + (1  p1)
Z 1
0
u(y + g +  V2s(p2))d (p2)
= lim
q!1
W †s (q, q˜).
Notice thatW †(q˜, q˜)   W †s (q˜, q˜) by Lemma 15 and limq!1W †(q, q˜) < limq!1W †s (q, q˜).
Fixing q˜, by the continuity ofW †(·, ·) andW †s (·, ·), there exist a threshold q(q˜) 2 (q˜, 1)
such that W †s (q, q˜) > W
†(q, q˜) for q   q.
Let q ⌘ q(0). On the one hand, Lemma B8 implies that Ws(q, 1) = W †s (q, 0) >
W †(q, 0) = W (q, 1) for q   q(0). On the other hand, Lemma 15 implies that
W (q, 0)   Ws(q, 0). Fix q   q. Because W (q, ) and Ws(q, ) are both contin-
uous in  , there exists a threshold   such that Ws(q, ) > W (q, ) if   >  .
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